Government consumption and private consumption correlations by Jane Marrinan
Go v ernm en t Cons um ption and Pr iv ate Con sum ption Corr elations
￿
Ja ne Ma rri na n
D epa rtm ento f E co nom ics, Uni vers ita t P om p eu F abra
Ram on T rias F arga s, 25 -27, 08 0 05 B a rc el o na, Spa in
T his re visi o n: Octob er 2 4, 19 96
Abstr a ct
Thi s pap e r e xa m in es whethe r the in tr od uctio n of go ver nme n t c on sum ption ex p e nditur e in a
standard one go o d mo de l of the intern ational re al busines s cyclei s su￿cien t to re concil e the
theory wi t h the exi s tin g patter n of in te rnati onal cons umpt i on a nd output corr ela t ions. I c ali-
brate the m o de l to t wo di￿e ren t pairs of countries and gene rate the simulate d distr ibution of
consum ptio n and out put corre latio ns im plied bys ever al sp e ci￿catio ns of the mo de l. It is s ho wn
that the m o de l c an ac count fo r existing i n te rnati onal c onsum ption c orre la tions on ly unde r very
sp e ci￿c as sum ptions ab out the size of e￿ ec to f gover nme n t e xp enditure on ag en ts’ ut ili t y or
the v ariabi li t y of go v e rnm en t exp e nditur e s ho c ks. Cruc ial param e ters are id en ti￿ed and the
sen sit ivit y of the re sults discu sse d.
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1 In tr o duct ion
In a recent pap er Dev eraux, Grego ry a nd Smi th (DG S) (199 2) have arg u ed that e xi st in g cr oss
country consumpti on corr e lations are at o dd s with the prop ertie s of ao ne go o d, stat i onar y , Arro w-
Debreu mo de l. In that econom y when agen ts ha ve id en tical an d hom otheti c pre ference s, c ross
country pri v at e consumpti o n corr e lations are p erfect i n the fa c e of id iosy ncratic ou tp ut ￿uc tuations.
Thi s i s b e cause wi th mar kets for all d ates an da l l states of the world agents o f e ac h countr y can
p erf e ctl yi nsure t h emselv es b y wr i tin g conti ngent cl aims so as to el imi nat e indi vidua l i di osyncra ti c
risk and b ear onl y aggrega te (nondi versi￿abl e) risk. DG S rep or t consumpti on correl at io n s ac ross
a n u m b er of c ou n tri es u si ng di￿eren td etr e ndi ng tra n sf ormat i ons d esigne d to e xt ract the cycl ic al
comp one n t of p ri v ate c on su mption. The y ￿nd that correl at io n s are si gn i￿ ca n tl y di ￿e re n t fr om one,
i n some case s qui te l o w an df o r all countri es c on side rabl y l ow er tha n output correl a ti o n s. B ac kus,
Ke ho e and K ydland (B KK) (1 992 ), Ba xter and Cruci ni (1 993 ) and Cano v a an d Rav n (19 96) ,
amo n g others, h a ve do c umented a si mil ar pat tern usin g di￿eren t data set s, di￿eren t time p eri o ds
and d i￿eren t estimation tec hn ique s.
Th e large di sc re pancy of the the ory fro m the data h as prompted Backus, Keho e and Kydl an d
(1 995) to te rm th e magni t ud e of cro ss country consumpti on correlations rel ativ e to out p ut corre-
l ati on s as one of the ma jor une xplai ned pu zzl es of the i n te rn ati on al b usi ness c ycle l iterat u re. The
rel a ti v el y l o w v al ue of the c on sumption correl ati on has a ls o ge nerat ed sub stan ti al d iscu ssi on i n p ol -
i cy ci rcl es where it ha s b een suggest e d that there i s a n eed for i n ternat i ona l go v er n ment in st i tut i ons
pro vidi ng addi ti onal ri sk s ha ri ng arrangemen ts for ag e n ts of di￿eren t cou n tr i es (see e.g . Persson
and T ab el li ni (19 96) ). T o reduce the d isc r e pan cy b et ween theory and dat a an d b e tter u ndersta n d
whya ct ua l economies d eviate fro m the si m pl e Ar ro w-D eb reu para d igm, t he s t andard one go o d
mo del has b ee n extended in sev eral d imensions. F or e xa mpl e, Sto c kma na nd D el l as (1989), T es ar
(1 993) and Van Winc o o p (1993) ha vei n tro duce dn o n- t r ade d go o ds; DGS (1992) h a ve mo di￿ed the
preferen ce sp e ci￿cat i on commo n ly used in the li tera ture; Kol lman (1995) a nd Baxt er and Cruci ni
(1 995) h a vei n tro du ced c a p ital con tro l s or inco mpl ete mark et s. W hi l e the ￿ r st t w o mo di￿cat io n s
hav e b ee n part i ally succ essful, li miting t rade i n ￿ nancia l assets ha s fai l ed t o pr o d uce the rel a-1 I NTRODUCTION 2
tiv e orde ri ng of in ternat i onal consumpti on and ou tpu t cor rel ations and th ea bs o l ute magni t ud e of
cross countr yc o n sumption co rrel at i ons w e ob serv e in th ed a t a unless the di scoun t fact or of the
represen tat i ve agen t is al so endogeni zed.
In thi s pa pe r I exami ne whe th er one al terna ti ve mo di ￿cation of the basi c mo d el is more su c-
cessful in quan ti ta ti v e ly re pro duci ng the b eha vi or of actual dat a. I in tro duce a governmen t se ctor
i n the econom y and examin e the e￿ects of go v ern m en t exp e ndi tu re sho c ks on i n ternat i onal con-
sumpti o na nd output cor rel ations. Severa l studi es, in cl udi ng Aiyaga ri , Ch ristiano, Ei c h en baum
(1 992) , Chri st i ano and Eiche n baum (199 2) and Baxter and King (199 3), ha ve exami ned the e￿ects
of governmen t consump ti on exp end iture i n c losed economies. V an Win co op an d Marrinan (1996 )
extend ed the analysis to op en economies b y studyi ng th e impl i cat i ons of governme n t sp endi ng an d
ta xation fo r private an d p ubl ic cross country savi ngs and i n v estmen td e cis i ons. B axter (199 3) has
studi ed how gov e rn ment e xp en diture di sturbances are tr ansmi tted across countr ie s . It is therefore
worth whil e to exami ne whether th e presence of governmen t c on su mption exp endi ture in the mo del
i s an imp orta n t el ement to u ndersta n d the patt e rn of i n ternat i onal pri v ate consumpti on cor rel a-
tions. I f thi s mo d i￿c ati on i s proved succe ss fu l in qu a n ti tativ el y re pro duci ng the features of act u al
data we are in terested in , i t may also p rovi de rational e for mo d els of i n tern at i onal risk shar i ng
where a countercycl i cal governmen t exp end iture helps to i nsure , di re ctly or in di re ctl y , dome sti c
consumers from imp or ted sho c ks.
Th e mo d el features a sin gl e go o d, wh ic hi sp ro d uced i n b oth c ou n tri es, an d a g o vernmen ts e ctor
whi c h consumes a fraction of the go o ds pro duc ed i n its o wn country . Go v ern me n t exp endi ture
pro vide s util ityt o dom e st i c agen ts in th e for m of a ￿ow of se rvi ces from the go od s whi c h are
consumed . Go vernmen t exp end iture sho c ks therefore ha ve t wot yp es o fe ￿ ec t s: a \ wealth" e￿ect
thro ug h the budget constrain t and a \substituti o n" e ￿ ec t t hr o ugh t h eu t il i ty function of the r ep -
resen tati v e agen t. Although these t wo e￿ects p r od u c e d i ￿ erent dynamics fo r i n v es t ment, lab or
supp li es a nd o ut pu t s, t he y bo t hg o i nt h ed i r e ction of generatin g negat iv ec o r rel at i ons b et w ee n
c hanges in go vernmen t consu mpt io n a nd c hanges in pri v ate c o nsu mpt io n . Because go vernmen t
consumpti on e xp en diture and pri v at e consu mpt io n a re i mp erfect substitut es in u t il i t y and b e cause
the ￿o wo f s er v ic e s g o vernmen te x p e n d i ture g e nerat es cann o tb e r e l o c a t ed i n ternational ly ,i t e s -1 I NTRODUCTION 3
sential ly pla ys the rol e of a non-tra d ed c on su mption go o d. The re fo re, dist urbances to governmen t
exp endi ture dr iv ea wedge b etw e en the time pro ￿ le of domestic a nd forei g nc o nsumptio ns . Thi s re-
du ces i n ternat i onal pri v ate c on su mption corr e lations even when in ternat ional ￿ nanci al ma rk ets are
compl ete si nce risk sharing p ertains to ful l consumpti on (priv at e pl us go v e rn ment consumpti on ),
and may i n princ ip le hel p to accoun t for the low i n ternati onal consu m pt i on c orrel ati on s we observ e
i n actual data . Not e that the sp eci ￿cat i on u sed h ere d i￿ers fro m Sto c km an an d T e sa r (199 5) who
use pri v at et a s te sho c ks to pro d uce th e sub st i tution t yp e of e￿ ects disc ussed ab o ve an d from BB K
(1 993) who c on si de r on ly the w eal th e￿e ct o fg o v e rn ment sh o c ks via the budge t constra i n t.
Although the me c han ism just de sc ri b ed i s app e al in g, th e cruci al question I address i n this p ap er
i s whe th er real isti c go v e rn ment exp end iture pro cesses are quan ti ta ti v el y abl e to brin g si m u lated
pri v ate i n tern ati on al consump ti on correlati on s in th e range of what w e ob s erve in th e data an d
repl i cate the rel at i ve magni tu de of in ternat i onal consu mpt i on and output cor rel at io n s . T o an swer
thi s question I cal ibr ate the mo d el to tw o di ￿eren t pairs of countrie s (US vs . Ca n ad a and US vs.
Europ e) and, as i n DG S (199 2), I generate the sim ul at e d dist ri buti on of cros s country consu mp ti on
and output correlations i mpl ie d b y di ￿erent sp eci ￿cat i ons of the mo del. In orde r to compute
meani ngful cro ss cou n try c orrel ati ons, i t is nece ssary to render the serie ss t ationary . Be cause
exi st i ng evi den ce and av ail abl e econometr ic techn ol og y d o n ot all o w us to con￿de n tl yc ho ose one
pro ced ure o ver anot h er (on thi s p oint, see Cano v a (1993)) , I stud y the impl i cati on s of the mo del
for i n ternat i onal consumpti on cor rel at i ons usi ng three al ter na ti v e d etr en di ng p ro c edures, e ac h of
whi c hi s ap pl ied b oth to ac tu al and si mula ted dat a.
I sho w that when governme n t consu mp ti on pro vides uti l ity enhanc ing servi ces for dome sti c
ag en ts, a mo de l where go vernmen t sho c ks a re the onl y d isturbances i n the econom yh a s some p o-
tential to rep r o d uce the cross se ct i onal range o fi n ternati o nal consumpti on and output cor rel at io n s
we obse r vei nt he data, regardl ess of t he d etr e nding me t ho d e m pl o yed. T od o s o, ho w ever, w e ne ed
a su￿cien tly high lev el of sub st it u t a bil it yb e t ween priv at e consumption a nd g o vernmen tc o ns um p -
tion, ab o ve the v al ue esti m ated b yK o r men di (1983) or Ashaue r (1 985). Ho wever, when go vernmen t
consumpti on exp e ndit ur e do es not a￿ect u t ili t yo f domestic agen ts, there i s no s p eci￿cati o no f t h e
mo del that can rep ro duce the pat tern of in ternational consumpti o na nd o ut pu t c o r rel at i ons w es e e2 S OME EM PI RI CAL EVIDENCE 4
i n the dat a (consi st e n t wi th the re sults of BB K (19 95)) . Th ese resul ts are not to o sensit iv et o the
si ze o f the countr ie s or to al te rn ati v e settin g so f some unmeasured paramet e rs wi th in a re asonabl e
range. There are h o wev e rt wo cru cial para meters (t h er i s k av e rsi on para me ter and the para meter
of the adjustmen t cost fun cti on) whi c h determin e b ot h the shap e and the lo c ati ono f the si m u lated
di st ri buti on of consumpti on and output corr e lations. By pi nni ng down these pa rameters wi th more
preci si on w e ma y th erefo re i mpro veo u r un derst and in g of the prop e rti es of t hese mod els for the
questi o no f in terest. Fi nall y , I d emo n st rate that when b ot h governmen t and pro duc t i vi t y d istur-
bance s are presen t, the v ari abil i t y of go v e rnm en t exp end iture di sturbanc es must b e ab out 100 ti mes
l arger than what w e se e in the data an d ab out 25 ti mes l arger than the v ari abil i t y of pro duc t i vi t y
di st u rbances fo r the mo del to come cl ose to repro duce e xistin g cross c ou n tr yc o r rel ations fo r each
pai ro f c ou n tri es w e consi der.
Th ep a p er is org ani zed as fol lows. The next secti on presen ts empi ri cal evi dence concerni ng
the si ze of i n ternat io n a l c on su mption and output correlations and d iscu ss es some i ssues conne cted
with measuremen t errors i n c on su mption. Sec ti on 3 presen ts t h e mo del and se cti on 4 d iscu sses its
cal ibration. Se cti on 5 presen ts the resu lts and se cti on 6 concl ud es.
2 So me Em pirical E videnc e
The c h aracteri sti cs of in te rn ati on al consu mp ti on and out p ut corr e lation s are, b y now, w e ll do c u-
mented and unde rsto o d (se e e .g. BK K (199 2), DGS (199 2) or Cano v a an d R a vn (19 96) ). I n thi s
secti o n I th erefo re on ly brie￿ y outli ne the general feat ur es of th e ph enome non and di scuss some
i ss u es conne cted wi th th e presen ce of measuremen t erro r i nc on su mption d at a.
Since b o th consu m pt io n a n d output data app ear to b e n o ns t ationary a nd n o t co in tegr ated, a
meani ngful bilateral cro ss coun try cor rel at i on anal ysis can b e co mp ut e d o nly after trends a re re-
moved from the seri es. The exist in g l i tera ture has prop osed sev era lw ays t o decomp ose a s er ie s in to
tr e nd and cycle, a ll o f w hi c h are reas onabl e giv en existin g time seri es t ec h nology and the a v ai labl e
data sampl es. C ano v a (1993) e mphasizes t ha t di￿eren t detr e nding metho ds i nduce substan ti ally
di￿ er en t momen ts for the c ycli cal c o mp o ne n to f t he d a t a. In p a rti cula r, he s ho ws t ha t b oth the
absolu t ea n dr el a t i v em a gni tude of v ari a bil ities, the size of the corr e lations w it h G NP a nd t h e s i z e2 S OME EM PI RI CAL EVIDENCE 5
and the pat tern of i mpulse resp o ns es are al l sensi ti ve to th ec hoice of t ren d remo v al p ro c edure.
T oe xa mi ne whether th e qu an ti tativ e abi li t yo f the mo del to rep li cate the data de p end s on the
pro ced ure used to remo ve the tr e nd, I exami ne th re e detr e ndi ng app ro aches: the ￿rst remo v e s a
l in ear trend (LT￿ lter), t h e second a sto c h asti c but smo oth trend (Ho dr ic ka nd Prescot t (HP) ￿ lter
with ￿ = 16 00) an d the th ird a sto c hastic uni t ro ott r e n d (￿ rs t order d i￿erenc ing (F OD) ￿lter). As
noted i n Cano v a an d Ravn (1996), each of t h ese metho ds l ea ves c ycle s of d i￿er en t a verag e durat i on
in th e dat a: L T ￿l te ri ng le a ves cycl es of avera ge du ration of ab out 8- 10 year s i n the data , HP
￿l tering cycl es of a verag e du ration of ab out 4-6 years an dF OD ￿lteri ng c ycl e s of av e rage durat i on
of ab out 2-3 year s. Therefor e ,b y comparin g the resul ts acro ss detrendi ng m eth o ds, w e not onl y
p erf orm ab asi c sensi tivi t y analysi s need ed b e cause the prop ertie s of the t re nd are unkno wn, but
also stud y the str e ngt h of the cross country asso ci ati on of c on su mptions a n d outpu ts fo r cycl es of
di ￿er en t d ura ti on .
T ab le 1 rep o rts pai rwi se consumpti on cor rel ations for 9 O EC D countrie s. Pan el Ac o n tai ns the
resul ts for L T ￿l tered dat a, Pan el B for HP ￿l te re d d ata and Panel C fo r F O D ￿l t ered dat a. I n
each pan el , the standard d evi ati on s of the c orrel at i ons are i n parenthe sis . T abl e 2 re p ort s th e same
i nfo rmation for pairwi se output corr e lations. The d ata and thei r sources a re descri b e d i n detail i n
the app endi x.
T ab le 1 shows sev eral i n te re st i ng r eg u lariti es. Fi rst , the si ze of the c ros s countr y consu m pt io n
correlation do es c hange wi th the detrendi ng metho d: i t is highe r wh en the cycl ic al comp on en t con-
ta i ns cycl es of l on ger a verage d ura ti on (medi an v alu e 0.393 an d maxi m u m 0. 8 26) and almost zero
when cycl es of onl y2 - 3 years are consi dered (medi an v al ue 0 .15 4 an d maxim um 0.53 1). T o fo rmall y
con￿rm thi s i mpressi o nI t es t whether consump t i on cor rel at io n s a r es i m i l a ra cross detrendi ng meth-
q p q
o ds. F or thi s p urp ose I use a distance test of the f orm J =[ cor r ( i;j ) ￿ cor r (i; j )] ( va r(cor r (i; j )) +
p ￿ 1 q p p q
va r ( cor r ( i; j )) [cor r ( i; j ) ￿ cor r ( i;j ) ] where cor r ( i; j ) and corr ( i; j ) is t he c o n su mption cor-
rel a ti o nb e t ween coun try i and j using de t rend ing metho d p;q = HP ;L T ; F O D .U n de r the n ul l
2
of e quali t y , J i s dis tri buted as a ￿ (1 ). Not surpri sing ly ,t he t es t rejects t he n ul l h yp othesi s i n all
cases. Second, wi t hi n ea c hp a n el, the mag n itude of cross -c o u n try consump t io n c o r rel at i ons fo ra l l
pai r so f c o un tri es is compara bl e e v en though the cor rel ation am ong pai r so f E u r op ean coun tri es2 S OME EM PI RI CAL EVIDENCE 6
app e ars to b el arger th an th e cor rel at i on amo n g the other countr ie s of t he panel . Final ly , for
all detrend in g metho ds , consumption c orrel ati ons are si gni ￿cantl yd i ￿er en tf r o m on ea t standard
si gn i￿c an ce l evels .
Th e fact that in ternat i onal consumpti on correl ati on s are si gni ￿cantly di ￿erent from one i sn ot
p er-se to b e tak en as a rejecti on of the compl ete mark e t Arro w-Debreu assump tion. I ff a c t o rs
ot h er than c on sum p t i o n of t radabl es a￿ect util i t y (e. g. home pro du ction or lei sure), theoretic al
consumpti on corr e lations wi ll b e di ￿e re n t from one as expl ain ed i n Cano v a an d Ra vn (199 6). The
pu zzl e con cerns the siz e of consump ti on cor rel at io n s relativ e to outpu t co rrelations. Compar i ng
ta b les 1 and 2 we see that consumpti on correlations are al wa ys l o wer than ou tp ut corr e lations wh en
the HP ￿l ter i s u sed to detrend the data (medi an v al ues 0.28 2 and 0. 412 resp ectiv ely). How e v e r,
with the ot h er tw o ￿l te rs, th ere are man y c ases where consump t io n an d ou tp ut correl ati on s are
si mil ar i n ma gni tude (a n d st atisti call y not si gn i￿c an tl y d i￿eren t) and i n som e c ases consu mp ti on
correlations even e xceed outpu t correl a ti on s (i n part i cul ar, with L T me th od ). Thi s su g gests t h at the
rel ati v e mag n itud e of cro ss countr y consumpti on and output c orrel at i ons c h an ges acro ss frequenc ies:
on av e rage c on sumption correl at i ons are l arger than ou tpu t cor rel at i ons f or cycl es of 8-10 year s,
they are smal ler for cyc les of 4-6 years and ap proxi ma tel y of the same magni tu de for cycl es of 2-3
year s.
Although the basic features of the c on sumption correl at i ons prese n ted app ear to b e robust
withi n each panel , one sh ou ld b e v e ry careful in vi ewi ng the m as est abl i shed empi ric al regulari ti es
whi c h shoul d b e ra ti on al i zed b y a mo del . Fi rst , the o nl y c on su mption data wh ic h is consi sten tl y
a v ail abl e across coun tries o na qu a rterly basis meas u res tot al (durabl es a nd non-du ra bl es) c ons um p -
tion exp endi ture b y domesti c resi den ts. As wi ll b ec ome clear i n the next se c t i on, the consu m pt io n
we measure i n the mo del has no durabili t y asp ects so the ma tching of the mo de l t ot he data i s
i mp erfect. One w ay out of thi s impasse i s to include durable consumpti on go o ds i n t h e mo del, as
e.g. i n D un n an d Singleton (1 986). B ecause the lev e l of compl i cat io n i n tro duce d byt h i s a dd itio na l
feat ur e i s s ub s t antial , I do not fol lo w thi s approac h. One si mpl e al t er na ti v ei s t o v eri f y that the
prop ortion of durables to nondurables i n consump t io n is s t abl e o v er t i me and that the v ari a bi l it y
of the t w oc o mp onen ts i s not to o di￿ er en t.I f t h is is the case, the corr e latio n prop ertie s of t otal3 THE MODEL 7
consumpti on wi ll not b ev ery d i￿eren t from t ho se of nondu rabl es an d servi ces. F or those coun tri es
for wh ichd isagg regat ed consumpti on dat a exi st (US , UK ,J ap an ,F ranc e) I do ￿nd th at the pro-
p ortion of d ura b les in t otal consu m pt io n exp end iture i s i ncreasin g, but no t substan ti ally .H o w e v e r,
the v ari abil i t y of the tw o comp one n ts d i￿ers, wi th du rabl es be i ng mo re c ycl i cal th an nondurabl es
and services. This may the re fo re in duce an u p w ard b ias i nt he estimates we re p ort in panel s A an d
B of ta b le 1. Ne v erthel ess, t he order of mag n itude of the d i￿erence i s n ot so l arge as to cause gr e at
conce r n. F or exampl e, the correlation b e t ween US an d U K c on sumption of nond ur abl es is at mo st
1
10 % d i￿eren t fro m the cor rel at i on of to tal con sumption, regar d less of the d etr e ndi ng metho d .
3 The Mo del
The mo del w e e mplo y to accoun t for th ee x i sti ng pat tern of c on sumption and ou tput cor rel at i ons
i s the same as i n Baxter and Cruci ni (1 993 ). I t is a t wo- country mo d el with a si ngl e consu mp ti on
go o d. Ea c hc o u n try is p opu lated b y a l arge n umb er of i den ti cal ag en ts and lab or i s assumed to b e
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where c is p ri v ate co ns u mption of the singl e comp osi te go o d b y the re presen t ati ve ag e n t of c ou n try
h t
h and z = ￿ g where g me asures r ea lg o vernmen t consu mp ti on i n country h and ￿ i s a consta n t
ht g ht h t g
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A secon d an d more i mp orta n t prob lem co ncerns the measu remen t of con sumpti on . It is wel l k no wn tha t con-
sumptio n data sa mpled at ￿ne i n terv als contain sas u b s tanti al amo un t of mea sure men t error w hi c h is corre lated o v er
ti me. Thi s measu remen t error ma yb l u r t h e tru e f e atures of cros s count r y con s umpti on co rrelat io ns . I n a dd i t i o n, as
no t ed b yW i l co x (199 2), mea suremen t erro r may b e a more severe probl em than p revious ly n oted b e cause qu arterly
con sumpti on d ata are i n terp olated by statistical ag encies using con sumption measurements obtai ned e very ￿v e years
an d mon thly sales data . Apart from th e statist i cal distortions whi c hm a yb ei n tro d uced b e cause of this i n terp olation
(e.g. co nsumption ma y b e excess iv el y smo oth ), i t may w el l b e th at d i￿eren tc o u n tri es u se d i￿eren ti n terp ol ating
algorithms an d th at th e a ctual me asurement of consumption i s u ndertak en at d i￿eren tp o i n ts i n time. T hi s l a s t
p os s i b i l i ty i s particularly problematic since th e true features of actu al co nsumption correlati ons ma y b e compl etel y
distorted when series with di￿ere n tb a s e y ea rs are in te rp olated and compa red. Beca use n o i nformation i s a v ail able
on this i ssu e, I u nde rtak en oa d j u stmen t. Ho wev er, i t sh ould b e cl ear t h at th e pres ence o f measuremen t error s i n
con sumpti on b oth withi n an d across co un tri es consti tutes a seriou s p robl em when i t co mes t o verifyi ng th e emp iri cal
v ali dit y of a th eoretical mo d el, esp eciall y when th e frequ ency of a v ai l able data do e s no t corres p on d to the frequency
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param e ter de t er mi ni ng t he substi t utabi li t y (or the com p le men tarit y) b etw ee n pri v at e an d pub li c
exp endi ture (as in Ashauer (1 985)).
Th ere are man y ways i nw h i c h gov e rn ment activi t y ma y a￿ect p ri v ate dec ision s. Ashaue r (19 89),
Barro and Sal a -i - M a r ti n (19 90) and B axter and Ki ng (1 993) h a ve c ons i d e re dh ow the p rovisi on
of i nfr astructures and othe r exp e ndi tu re s in pub li c ca p ital format i on a￿ e ct th e pro du cti vi t y of
pri v ate factor s and pri v at e output. He r eI fol lo w anot h er strand of l iterat u re , i ni ti ally con sidered
b y Barro (1981) and further e xa mi ned b y Ashauer (198 5), B arro (19 89) and ot h ers : governmen t
exp endi ture on go o ds an d servi ces is not pro du ctiv eb u t yi el ds di re ct uti li t y fo r th e agen ts of the ir
o wn c ou n try vi aa li near te c hnology which transfo rms governmen t consumpti on i n to consu mp ti on
go o ds fo r pri v ate use. Wh en ￿ = 0 governmen t h con sumption do e s n ot a￿ ec t uti li t y , whi le wh en
g
0 <￿ ￿ 1, go v e rn ment and private d omesti c consumpti ona re sub st i tutes an d wh en ￿ < 0 they
g g
are compl ements. Al so , whe n ￿ < 1, i t i s costly for so ci ety to hav e th eg o vernm e n t \p ro d uce"
g
go o ds for private con sumption.
In tui ti vely , one can th ink of g as mi li ta ry e xp end iture, as i n B axter and Ki ng (1993 ), as
ht
fede ral ci vil i an sp e ndi ng (e. g. ed ucational subsi di es) , as i n Graham (199 3) or b oth. Whi c hever
i n terp re tation one tak es, I mak e the st rong but conveni en t assu m p ti on that go v e rn me n t c on su mp-
tion exp en di ture on di ￿erent ca tegori es of go o ds h as the sa me e￿ect on the ma rginal uti li t y of
consumpti on. I n ot he r wor d s, i f g i ncludes bo th mil i tary exp e ndi tu re and e ducational su bsid ies,
ht
￿ i s the same for b oth typ es of exp end itures (see Kormendi (198 3) fo r som e e mp iri cal evi den ce
g
conce r ni n g th e si ze of ￿ across t yp es of gov e rn ment exp endi tures) . The go o d s ar e pro du ced wi th
g
a Co b b-Douglas technolo gy:
￿ 1 ￿￿
Y = A ( K )( X N ) h =1 ; 2 (3 )
ht ht ht ht
ht
where X = ￿X 8h wit h ￿ ￿ 1. X represe n ts lab o r-augmen tin g Har ro d- neutral t ec hnologica l
ht ht ￿1 ht
progr es s with d eterm i nistic g ro wt hr a te equal t o ￿ . Pro ductio n requires domestic lab o ra n d capita l
i nputs a n d is sub ject t oa t e c hn o lo g i cal d isturbance A whose prop ertie s wi l l b e de scrib ed l a ter
ht
on.3 THE MODEL 9
Capi ta l go o ds are accum ul at e d accordi ng t o:
K = (1 ￿ ￿ ) K +   ( I =K ) K h = 1; 2 (4 )
h t +1 h ht ht h t ht
I
ht
where   ( ) > 0 is conca ve and represen ts the cost of i nsta l l in g new capital or m o vi ng n ew capi ta l
K
h t
fro m the l o cation where i t is pro d uced to th e ot h er cou n try . These t ransacti on costs hel p to av oi d
un re al isti call y l arg e cross b order capital movements i n resp onse to tec h nologic al d isturbance s. The
for mulat io n for the adjustmen t cost fu nction is si mi l ar to Baxt er and Cr uc i n i (1 993 ) an d is c hosen
1
b ecause i t re tai ns simp li ci t y , whi l e li n k i ng tra ns a cti on cost s to T obi n’s Q. i s in fa c t T obi n’s Q,
0
 
i .e. the price of existi ng capi tal in one l o cat i on rel ati v e to the pric e of new capi ta l .
Lei sure c hoi ces are constra i ned b y:
0 ￿ l + N ￿ 1 8 h (5 )
ht ht
where the total e ndo wmen to f time in eac h countr y is n ormali zed to 1.
Gov e rn ments ￿n an ce thei r c on su mption purchases b y ta xi ng nat i onal output s with a di st ort i ng
ta x and th en tra n sf e rri ng what remai ns back to domestic resid en ts. It i s ass umed th at governmen t
exp endi ture is st o c hastic , whi le tax rat es ar e paramet ri call y gi ven. Al tho u gh there ar e mo del s
(see e.g. Braun and McGrat tan (1 993 ) or v an Win co op and Mar ri nan (1 996) ) whe re tax rates
are st o c h asti c, here I adopt a p arametr ic rep r e sen tation i n order to isol at e the con tri bution of
governmen t exp e ndi tu re d isturbance s to the sol ution of the i n ternat i onal consump ti on cor rel at i on
pu zzl e. F urther, I assu me tha t the governmen t bud ge tc o ns t rain t is bal an ced on a p eri o d b y p eri o d
basi s. Bec aus e the econom y is Ri car d ian, the addition of one p erio d governm en t bo nd s to the
￿n a nc ing p ossib il it ie s o f t h e g o vernmen ts wi ll n o tc hang e equ il ibr iu m a llo c a t io n s . The go vernmen t
bu dg et c ons t rain ti s g i v en b y:
g = TR + ￿Y 8 h (6 )
ht ht hh t
where ￿ ar et ax rates and TR are l ump sum transfers in coun tr y h.
h h
Th e econom y wid e resource constrain ti s g iv en b y:
￿ ( Y ￿ g ￿ c ￿ k )+ ( 1 ￿ ￿ )( Y ￿ g ￿ c ￿ k ) ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ )k ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ )(1 ￿ ￿ ) k (7 )
1 t 1t 1t 1 t+1 2 t 2 t 2 t 2 t +1 1 1t 2 2t3 THE MODEL 10
where w eh a ve im p l ici tly accoun ted fo r th e fact that ne w i n v e stmen ti sc ostl ya n d where ￿ is the
share of ag en ts li vin g in countr y 1. The w orl d econom yi s sub ject to a4 ￿ 1 v ec tor of sho c ks
w = [A ; g ] where w is a homo sk edastic pr oc ess wi th c on diti onal mean E ( w ) = ￿w and
t ht ht t t t t ￿1
v ari an ce ￿.
Th ere i s some empi rical e vi de nce (Costell o (19 93)) that pro ducti vit y di s t urbance s hav e small
bu t imp ortan t cro ss countr y lagged e￿ ec t s whic h are asymmetr i c an d that the y are so me wh at
contemp ora n eously corr e lated. There is al so some e vide nce tha t pro ducti v ity di sturbances a nd
governmen t exp e ndi tu re sh o c ks may b e negat iv ely correlated wi thi n countr ie s (see Finn (199 1) or
Chri sti an o and Ei c hen ba u m (1 992) ). T o accoun t for these e￿ec ts I let the ￿ an d ￿m a tri ces h a ve
a general st ructure a n d p e rform sim ul at i ons for v arious restric ted sp ec i￿ cati ons .
Fi nall y , as i n BK K (1 992) and Baxt e r and Cruci ni (199 3), I assume c ompl ete ￿ nan ci al mar kets
and free mo b il ity of ￿nanc ial capital ac ross countrie s. Whil e thi s assumpt ion may app ea ru nreali stic,
i t pro vide s a useful be nc hmar k to e v alu ate the mo del in the i deal si tuat i on where frictio n s, i n the
for m of tra n sa c ti on costs , ap p ear onl y in t h e go o ds mark et (for an al ternat i ve setup se e Baxter an d
Cruci ni (1995 ) or Kol lman (19 95) ).
T o￿ n d a solu ti on to the mo del I ￿rst de trend those v ar i abl es whi c h dr i f t ov e r ti me b y ta ki ng
rat i os of the or i gin al v ari able s with resp ect to th e l ab or au gme n ti ng technol ogi cal pro gress, e.g .
Y
ht




i s n ot Pareto op ti ma l and the comp e ti tiv e solu t i on di ￿ers fro m the so ci al pl anner’s sol ution. T o
solv e for the com p etiti v e equi l ib ri um I therefore solv e the probl em faced b ya pseu do so ci al p lanne r,
mo di fyin g the opti m al it yc on ditio ns to ta ke care of the di st ortions. The w eig h ts i nt h e so ci al
planner p r obl em are f ree para me t ers. F or coun trie s whi c h are otherwise ide n ti cal , they wi ll b e
c hosen to b e prop ortional to t he i n i tial p opulat i on siz e o fe a c h coun try . The mo di￿ed opti ma lity
conditions are t he n app r o xi ma ted wi th a l o g-l i near e xpa n sion aro u nd the st ea d y state as in K ing ,
Pl o sser and Reb elo (1 988). Time seri es f or a ggregate consumpti o n and output in eac h coun try are
computed analyti cally from the appro ximat e opti m al it yc o nd i t i ons and i n ter na ti o na l cor rel at io n s
are compu t ed b y pass in g s im ula ted time serie s thro ug h the sa me three detren ding me t ho d s w eh a ve
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4 Cal ib rati on and So me Discussion
T o fa ci l itat et he co mp a ri so n wi th th e exi st i ng li tera ture, the mo del is cal ibr ated to tw o si tuations,
one where the tw o countrie s h a ve the same st o c hastic drivi ng pro cesses as th e US and Canada (as
i n DGS (19 92) ) and one where they replic ate the sto c h asti c pro cesses of the US and Eu rop e( as
in BKK ( 1992)) . These tw o si tu ati on s rep re sent tw o very di v erse en vi ro n ments si nce the US h as a
share of worl d output wh ic h is ten times as la r ge a sC anada (42. 8% vs 4.1 %) whi le i t has ab out the
same share of w orld output as the EEC (4 2.8 % vs 37. 1%) . Note also that the dee p paramet e rs of the
mo del calibrat ed to the l ong run av e rages of the dat a in the three economi es ar e v e ry si mil ar (see
e.g. DGS (1 992) , BB K (1992 ), Mendoza (1991 ), Car d ia (1991 )o r Cano v a an d Mar rin an (199 6)) .
Thi s hel ps to justi fy the abstract i on of takin g th e countrie s in the a rti￿ ci al ec on omy to b e i den tic al
i n terms of preferenc es and techn ol ogies w hi l e al lowing for some he terogen ei t y in th e sp eci￿cat io n s
of th ei r e xo gen ou s drivi ng for ce s .
Many of the par ameters used i n the tw o si tuations, wh ic h w e p re se n t i n table 3, are very
si mi l ar to those emp loy e d in th e ab o ve studi es and d o n ot requi re m u c h di scus sion: ￿ , the l ab our
x
￿
augmen ti ng techn ol og i cal prog ress i s set to 1. 004, the steady st ate l evel of hours N to 0. 2, the steady
sta te share of governme n t exp endi ture in ou tpu t s to 0.2, the ta x rat e ￿ to 0.3 , th e shar e of l ab or i n
g
the pro d uction fun ction (1 ￿ ￿) to 0.5 8 for th e US- Canada pai r an dt o 0.6 0 for th e US-Eu rop e pai r.
Fin a ll y , the st e ad y sta te re al in terest rat e R i s set t o6 . 5 % pe r year . Those par ameters for whi c h
no previ ous mea su re ment i s a v ail able are ￿ xe d a-priori . These paramet e rs a re: ￿ , the e lastici t y of
the in vestmen t-capi tal ratio to T obin ’s Q, wh ic h i s se t to -0. 075, the stea d y stat ev al ue of T ob in’s
Q, se t equal to 1. 0, b ot h of whi c h are t h e v alue s empl oy ed b y Baxt e r and Cruc in i (1993 ), and the
dep recia ti o no f capita l ,s e t e qual to 0.025 p e r qu a rter. F i nal ly , follo wi n g tradi tion i n the empiric a l
real business cycle l i t er ature, t he r i s k a version p arameter, ￿ , i s set equal to 2.
Kor me ndi (1983), Ash a u er (1985) and Barro (1 989) ha v e esti m ated ￿ fro mv ari o u s data sets
g
obta in i n g valu es in the range [ 0 : 23 ; 0 : 45 ] dep endi ng on t he s p eci￿cation of t h e mo del, the sampl e
p erio d a n d the catego ri es of go o ds i ncluded i n g . R ecentl y G raham (1 993) h a sf o u n d a m uc hl a rger
ht
range of v al ues with an a vera ge estimate clo se to ze r o and so me si t ua ti o ns w h er e ￿ is estimated
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to b e negat iv e. Because of thi s large v ariet yo f estimates, I deci ded to re p o rt the resul ts obtain ed
i n￿ v e sub cases, in dexed b y th e v al ue of ￿ (￿ =0 ; 0 : 2 ; 0 :5 ; 0 : 8 and 1 :0), and exa mine whether
g g
the exact c hoi ce of ￿ ma kes a di￿erence.
g
Th ei nitia ls e t of sim ul ati on s are p erfor med fo r a si tu ati on wh ere coun trie s d i￿er only in the ir
si ze, i n whi c h case ￿ and ￿ are symmetric. The para meters for th e pro cess for t ec hnol ogy d istur-
bance s ar e fro m BKK and DGS. The para meters for governmen t d isturbances are fro m my own
estimates. A ta second stag e I also al l o w some asymmetrie s i n the exogenous pro cesses ac ross
countries.
As e mp hasize d in Gregor y and S mi th (1991 ), Cano v a (19 94) and others, to tak e the conc lu si ons
of c ali bra ti on e xercise s seri ously one must p rovid e so me anal ys i s of the se nsi tivi t y of the resu lts to
v ari a ti on s of the par ameters i n a nei ghb orho o d of the cal ibr ated valu es. Th is is b e cau se conc lu si ons
dra wnf r o m thi s typ e of exerci se often negl ect the fact that a cal ibrato r has av ai labl e only esti mates
of the para me ters o fi n terest (and i n some cases n ot even th at) and that param e ter unc ert ai n t y
and sel ecti on bi ases ma y b e i mp orta n t i n determi nin g the quali t y of the resu l ts. F or thi s rea son,
I und ert ak e an in formal sensi ti vit y anal ysis on the outcomes of the mo del by re pl icatin g th e b asi c
set of exp erimen ts for v al ues of the para meters withi n a reasonable range. Here, I wi ll presen t
sensi tivi t y resul ts whe n I v ary som eo f the pri v at e se cto r para meters whi c h are ￿ xed a-priori ( ￿ ; ￿ ),
and som e of th e p arameters of the AR r e presen ta ti on of th e d isturbance s and t hei r c o v ari an ce
mat ri x.
In descri bing the outcomes of the exp erimen ts I adopt the same pro b ab il is ti c app r oac h of DGS
and presen t the appro ximat e 90% con￿d ence i n ter v al (c on st ructed from the 5th to the 95th p er-
cen ti le) of the empiric a l de nsit y functio n so fs i m u lated cross coun try consumption c o rrel at io n s a nd
output cor rel at i ons. T h is range pro vi des a measure of t he sp r ea d of t h e sim ula ted d istribut io n s
whi c h can b e c o mpared w i th a normal c o n ￿dence range constructed from the en tr i e s o f t abl es 1
and 2. T o measure h o wf ar t he mo de l is fro mt he data I al so rep ort ap - v al ue whic h , for eac h
mo del sp eci￿cat i on, rep r es e n ts the probabil it yo f ￿ n d i n g a c r oss coun try c orrelation w hi c hi s l e s s
than or equ a lt o t h e c o rresp ond ing sampl e cro ss coun try corr e lation. Thi s p -v al ue i s the prop ort i on
of r ep l i cations for w hi c h the si m ula ted c r oss coun try co rrel at i on is l ess t han the hist ori cal v alu e .5 THE R ESUL TS 13
R
￿ x
In othe r words, if ￿ x i st h e pai rw is e correl ati on of i n terest , Ir e p ort P [ ￿ 1 <x ￿ ￿ x ] = p ( x )dx
￿1
where p ( x ) is t he empi rical di str i buti on of th es i m ul at e dc r o s s country cor rel at i ons. I n thi s w ay the
sample cro ss country correl at i on is treate da sa critical v alu e i n exami nin g the v ali di t y of the the ory .
V al ues cl ose to z ero or one i ndi cate that ￿ x i s in one of the tail s of the sim ula ted d istrib ution, i n
whi c h case the mo del p erf orms p o orly i n rep ro d uci ng international cor rel a ti ons, wh il e v al ues c lose
to 0.5 in dic ate that ￿ x i s close to the median of the si m u lated di str i bu ti on. In thi s l atter case, the
mo del do es a go o d jo b i n rep ro d uci ng the dat a. Fi nal ly , v al ues in the range [0 .0 5, 0.95 ] i nd icate
that th e mo d el is not si gn i￿c an tl y at od d s with t he d ata. T o cal cul at e this p-v al ue , I generat e 1000
sample s of 170 observ ations, an d us e the actual v al ues of consumpti on and ou tput correl ati on s b e-
t ween US and Canada and US and Europ e (a s rep or ted b y BBK (199 2)) as c ri tical v al ues. Be cause
the in i tial condi tions for the c ap ital st o c k are se t arbi tr ari ly , the i niti al 50 ob servat i ons for each
repl i cati on ar e di sca rd ed to el imi nat e in itial condi tion p ro b lems.
5 The Resul ts
The re sults of the basic exp erimen ts are p re sente d i n tabl e 4. I consi der th re e b enc hmark cases
where the sto c hasti c pro cesses for the t wo cou n tri es are symmetric: one wh e re onl y technol ogy
sho c ks a re presen t, one where onl y governmen t exp en di tu re sho c ks are prese n ta nd one where b oth
t yp es of d isturbances ar e presen t. The righ t pane l re p ort s re sults for the cas eo f t wo equal ly siz ed
countries (￿ = 0 : 50 ), as woul d b e the case app r oxi matel y fo r the US and Euro p e, wh il e the left
panel rep orts resul ts for the c ase of one countr y whi c hi s ab o ut ten ti mes as l arge as the other
( ￿ = 0 :90), as w oul d b e the cas e appro xi mat el y , for US and Canada.
Severa l features of t he t a bl e d eserv e commen t. First, the results a re onl y sl igh tly sen sitiv et o
the si ze of the t w o coun trie s and t o the exact dat a generating pro ce s sf o r t h e exog en o u s v ariabl es
of the mo del. T he r ange of c o nsu mpt i on corr e lations is sl igh tly higher whe n ￿ =0 : 9a nd w he n
the drivi ng pro cesses a re cal ibrated t om a tch the pro p erties of tec hn o lo g y and of go vernmen t
exp endi ture dist ur ba n ces i n the US and Canada but di￿erences are min o r. Thi sr e s u l t m a ys e e m a
l ittle surpri sing i n li ghto f t ho se obtaine d b yH e a d (1992) or Baxt er and Crucini (1993), whe r ei t i s
arg u ed that whe n a coun tr y acc o un ts for a l arg e p ort i on of w orld o ut pu t i t i s l e s s a b l e t o s mo oth5 THE R ESUL TS 14
i ts consump ti on pro ￿l e b y bo rro wi ng ab ro ad b ecause of i ts i mpact o nw orld ou tputs and in terest
rat es. Ho w e v e r, i t shoul d b e stressed th at th ey c on si de r onl y id i osyn cra ti c sh o c ks whi c h are sp eci ￿c
to the l arge country , whi le he r ew ea re consi dering d isturbance s to b oth cou n trie s whi c h ma tcht h e
sto c has ti cp r o cesses of the two typ e s of d isturbance s we see in the data so re sult sa r en ot dire ctl y
compara bl e .
Second, a mo del dri v e n onl yb yt ec hnology sho c ks ge nerat es (i ) al most p erfe ct i n te rn ati on al
consumpti on co rrel a ti on s regar d less of the size of the country and the au to correl ati on prop e rti es of
technol ogy di sturbances and (i i) a di st ri buti on of output correlations wi t ha me dian v alue b etw e en
0. 1 an d 0.4 de p en ding on t he de tren din g metho d. Bot h are c learl y at o dd s with the dat a. A mo del
dri v e no n l y b y governmen t e xp en diture sho c ks, on th e other hand , h as some p o te n ti al to gene rate
(i) th e t yp e of consumpti on c orrel at i ons we observ e in the data and (i i) th e re lativ e ra n kin g of c ross
country consu m pt i on and output correl at i ons. In part i cul ar, when ￿ i s b et ween 0. 5a n d 1.0 , the
g
90 % con￿de nce range fo rc r o ss cou n try consumption corr e lations gen era ted b y the mo del covers the
cross-coun tr y ra n ge of observ e d i n ternat i onal consumption corr e lations , re gardl ess of the metho d
empl o yed to detrend the d ata. Mo reo v e r, cross countr y consu mpt i on corr e la tions are, on a vera ge,
small er t h an outpu t correl ati on s for HP detr e nded data an d as b ig as outpu t correlati ons wi th L T
and FOD detrend ed d ata.
Th ird, as ￿ inc re ases, th ei mp ort anc e of go v ern me n t exp e ndi tu re sho c ks on pri v ate co ns u mp-
g
tion c orrel ati on s in crea se s. T o und ers tand why thi s is the c ase it i s u seful to note that whe n the
i ncome e￿ect o n lei sure i s p ositi v e , governmen t exp en dit ure sh oc ks h a ve t wo e￿e cts on pri v ate
ag e n ts’ de c i sions. F ir s t ,a sg o vernmen te x p end iture inc re ase s giv en in vestmen t, agen ts exp erience
an i ncome r e ductio n( w eal t h e￿ect) whi c h in d u c e s t h e m t ow or k harder. Thi s i ncreases h o ur s,
output and mak es pri v ate consumpti on fall. Second, increases i n go vernmen t exp endi ture i ndu ce
direct c ha ng es on in vestmen t whi c h, i n t ur n , pro duc e an i ndirect e￿ect o n hours, outpu t and con-
sumpti o n. The si g n of the dir e ct e￿ect on in vestmen ts dep end s on w he t he r c hanges in go vernmen t
exp endi ture are p ermanen to rt ransi t ory .I f t he c ha ng e s are p erma ne n t,s t ea d y sta te lab o r suppl y
i s shif ted , in vestmen t increases and i n the new steady sta te t he capit al / lab o r r a t io i s c o ns t ant. If
c hanges are transitory ,i n v es t ment d ecreases so that t h e comp osi t ec hange i n h o ur s a n d output i s5 THE R ESUL TS 15
small er rel ativ et o the c hange that o c curs wh en sho c ks are p e rmane n t. In b ot h cases do me s ti c
consumpti on dro ps and , be c a u s e of ri sk shari ng, foreign pri v ate consumpti on wi ll decrease as wel l.
Fin al l y , the e￿ect on fo rei gn output de p en ds on whethe ri n vestmen t inc re as es or d ecreases.
Th ese a re t he d ynamics fo l l o wi ng a go v ern me n t exp endi ture d isturbance whe n governmen t
exp endi ture d o es n ot e n te r the u ti l ityf u n cti on o fa gents. Ho wever, when ￿ 6= 0 an in crea se i n
g
governmen t e xp en di ture i ncreases p rivate a gents’ uti li t y . Thi s i nc re ase has tw o consequences. Fi rst ,
b ecause th ew eal th e￿ect is sma l l er, c hanges i n go v e rn ment consump ti on h a ve a small er e￿ec t on
l ab or su ppl y . Therefore, the l agg ed dynamic s of the mo del ar eh a m p ered. Second, b e cause the
redu cti on i n pri v at e consumption is comp en sa ted for b y th e i ncrease in governmen t consumption,
and b ecause agen ts are i ndi ￿e re n t b et ween private and p ubl ic consumption, p rivate consu mp ti on
dec re ase s more rel at i ve to th e c ase whe n ￿ = 0. Thi ss e cond e￿ect i s n ot shar e d ac ross countri es
g
b ecause, from th e p oint of vi ew of the domestic agen t, marg i nal u ti l ity is unc h an ged . Thi s imp li es
￿
that i n te rn ati on al pri v at e c on su mption corr e lations dec re ase whi le th e correl at i on b etw e en c an d
1t
￿
c sta ys consta n t. F or v alue s of ￿ lower than 1, the combi ned resul t of these t wo contrast i ng
g
2t
e￿ects de p en ds on th e p ersistence and th e v ari abi li t y of governmen t exp endi ture sh o c ks and on the
spi ll ov er e￿e cts of the tw o sh o c ks acro ss countr i es. As ￿ approac hes 1, governmen t exp endi ture
g
sho c ks do n ot i nduc e l agged d ynam i cs i n the system, as thei r e￿e ct on lab or su ppl y and in v e st ment
fades, and they p erfectl y crowd out pri v ate consump ti on.
Th is in terestin g feat ure of the mo de l, whi c h i s prese n tw he n go v e rn ment con sumpti on sho c ks
dri v et h e ec onom y , di sa p p ears when w e al lo wf o r bo t h governmen t and tec h nol ogy di st u rb an ces
to b e p res e n t. With a real istic paramet e rization the generat e d c on sumptio n corr e lations ar e very
si m ila rt ot h e one s gene r ated b ya m o d el where onl y tec hnolog y sho c ks are pre senti n t h e e conom y .
Thi s do es not co me a s a surpri s e since t ec hnology sho c ks ar ef our ti m es a sv ol atil e as g overn-
ment exp end iture sho c ks and they clear ly c o ns t it u t e the domin a n ts ource of ￿ uctuat i ons i n the
si m ulat i ons.
Fi nall y, the abi li t yo f t h e mo del t o repro duc e t h e dat ai s n o tv ery se nsitiv et o t h e detrendi ng
metho d e m pl o yed. Henc e, t h e di￿ eren ces w e noted i n tabl e 1 are due t ot h e f act that di￿ erent
detrend ing metho ds extra c t cycles of d i￿eren t d ura ti on f rom t he d a t a. W h en the dat a generated5 THE R ESUL TS 16
b y th em o de l is pa ssed through th e same ￿l te rs used to d etr en d act u al dat a, si mil ar qual itat i ve
di ￿e re nces e me rge.
T o su mmariz e, thi s ￿rst set of sim ul at i on resul ts in d i cates that whe n only g ov e rn me n t co ns um p -
tion sh oc ks driv e the e conom y and ￿ i s at some i n term e diate v al ue be t w ee n0 . 5a n d 1.0, th e mo del
g
generates pri v ate consumpti on correlations wh ic h are withi n the range of in ternat i onal priv at e con-
sumpti on corr e lations foun d in the dat aa nd the ranki ng b et ween cros s count ry consumption an d
output correl ati on s corr e ctl y rep ro d uces th e ranki ng w e ￿nd in the rea lw or ld. With the adopted
param e teri zation, governmen t consumption exp end iture pl a ys the role of a non traded go o d whi c h
i s nonsepara b le wi th pri v at e consumption i n the u ti l ity of agen ts an d can th erefore driv e aw edge
b et ween t h e time pro￿l e of pri v ate consu mp ti ons across countries. Ho wever , when onl y technol ogy
sho c ks d ri ve the econom y or wh en b ot h governmen t exp end iture a nd technol og y sho c ks dri v e the
econom y ,t he mo del gro ssl y fail s to rep ro duce th e data .
5.1 A Sens itivit y An alysis
F or sensi ti vi t y analysi s I hav e exam i ne d how th e di str i bu ti on of sim ul at e d i n te rna ti on al consu mp ti on
and output corr el a t i o n s c hanges when I v ary som e of the paramet e rs whi c h wer e ei the r ￿ xed a-
pri ori or measured wi th substan ti al error . I rep ort onl y a subset of th e si m u lations p erformed
with the most i n terest i ng ca ses summar i zed i n tabl es 5.1-5 .4. Th e tabl es re p or t the e￿ects of
i ncreasin g the adjustmen t c ost para meter fro m ￿ = ￿0 : 075 to ￿ = ￿0 :01, of inc re asi ng th e ri sk
a versi o np arameter ￿ fro m 2. 0 to 10.0, of redu ci ng the p er s i stence and of in c reasi ng the v ari ab il i t y
of governmen t ex p en diture dist urb an ces, and of all owi ng the para me t ers o ft he exogenous pro cesses
to b e c o un try sp eci￿c.
A compa ri son of t abl es 4 a nd 5 . 1 i ndicat es t ha t the results o bt ai ned are some what se nsitiv et o
the choice of the adjustm en t cost para meter. In creasing t he v al ue of the a dj u s t me nt cost para meter
has the e￿ect o f decreasing somewhat i n ternati o na lc o n sumption a nd o ut pu t corr e lations rega rdl ess
of t h e si ze of the coun try and, to a l ar ge ext en t, the source o f d isturbances. Thi s shoul d not come
as a surp r i se since the hig h er are the cost so f i n s t al li ng or mo ving capit al , the lo w e r i s the i nc en tiv e
to smo ot hc o n sumption vi a i n ter na ti o na lt rade i n i n vestmen tg ood s .I n p r acti ce, b y i ncreasi ng t his5 THE R ESUL TS 17
param e ter to v er y high v alue sw ec an ge nerat e arbi tr ari ly l o w consump t io n an d output correlations.
How ever, b ec a us e th e v al ue of -0. 075 i s such that t he vola t il ity of si m u late d i n v e st mentr e l ati v e to
si m ul at e d output i s app r oxi matel yt h e same a st he volatil ity of actual in vestmen t rel a ti v et o act u al
output, it is clear that the range of \r e al i st i c" v al ues of ￿ i s rel ati v ely small .
Increasi ng the ri sk aversion para me ter to a v alu e simi lar tow h a t is n eeded to so l ve th e equi t y
premi um pu zzl e (see Mehra and Pr es co tt (1 985)) al so h as the e￿ect of c hangin g b ot h the lo cat i on
and the spread of the si m u lated c ross country consump ti on and ou tpu t correl at i ons, rega rdl ess of
the detr e ndi ng metho d empl o yed. The di rection of th ec hanges, ho w ever, dep ends on the si ze of the
countries: fo r ￿ = 0 : 5 the 90% range i s smal ler and the medi an is l ar ger, fo r ￿ = 0 : 9 the opp os it e
i s tr ue . I n tu iti v e ly , th ese resul ts o ccu r b e cause whe n ri sk a versi on i s hi gh er, the in tertemp ora l
substi tu ti on of l eisu re , whi c h is the engin e generatin g most of t he dyn a mi cs of the mo de l wh en
governmen t exp e ndi tu re sh o c ks dri ve the e con omy , is lower. Hen ce, for a giv en v al ue of ￿ an d
g
of th e v ari a bi l ity of th e sho c ks, th e crowd ing out e￿ect of governmen t dist urb an ces i s st ronger the
l arger is the di ￿eren ce in the si zes of the tw o countr i es and the ma gni tude of si mulated i n te rn ati on al
consumpti on and output c orrel ati on s is red uced .
The li terat ure d iscu ssing the e￿ects of gov e rnmen t e xp en di ture sh o c ks i n g en era l equi l ibri um
mo del s had p ut substa n ti al emp has i so n the di￿eren tial e￿ects of transi tor y vs. p ersi st e n t d istur-
bance s (see e .g. Barro (198 1)) . Rece n tw or k b y Ai y agari, Chri sti an o and Ei c he n bau m (199 2) a nd
Baxter and K in g (199 3) suggests th at the re ar e not ma jo r qua l i tativ e di ￿ere n ces b et ween th ese
t wod i ￿e re n t t yp es of governmen t sh o c ks and instead concentra tes o n the qua n ti tativ e di ￿eren ces
pro du ced b y di￿ er en tp ersi st en ce pa rameters. Be cause these analyses w ere concerne d wi thc l osed
econom y framew orks, w e b eli evei t i s i n teresting to exami ne whether p ermanen t and t ransi t ory
governmen t disturbances p r o d uce quali tati v ely di￿ er en t result s for the questions of i n terest i n t his
pap e r. Consisten t with thei r conclusio n s, tabl e 5. 3i n d i c a t e st ha t reduc i n g the p ersi s ten ce of g ov-
ernmen t d isturbance s do es not c hange the quali ta ti v e feat u res of our results. In par ti cular , it i s s ti ll
the case that fo r ￿ ar oun d 0. 8a n d w h en onl y go vernmen td i s t ur ba n ces exist , t he mo del repro du ces
g
the dat ap r et tyw ell. Ho wever, when b oth disturbances are prese n t, the i mp o rt ance of go vernmen t
dist u rbances for t he m a gni tude o fi n terna ti ona l consu m pt i on correlation s fades. But, consi s tent5 THE R ESUL TS 18
with i n tui t i on ,t h e mo re tra n si tor y governmen t exp e ndi tu re d isturbances are, the mor e frequ en tl y
a w e dge b et ween the ti me pro￿l e of domestic an d for e ign p ri v ate consu m pt io n i s generat e d, and,
as a con sequen ce, the low er are i n ternat i onal pri v at e consu m p ti on cor rel a ti ons, giv en the siz e of
the t wo co un tri es, t h e ad ju st ment cost param e te r and the relati v e magnitud eo f the v arianc es of
the t wo t yp es of di sturbances. N ote also that , as exp ected, cross coun tr y output correlations are
small er when ￿ d ecreases fro m 0.9 5t o 0. 2.
g
Next, I ask w ha t is the v ari ab il ity of governmen t exp e ndi tu re d isturbance s that i s neede d in a
mo del whe re b oth gov e rn ment exp endi ture and technol ogy sh o c ks are presen t to generate cross-
country consumpti on corr e lations whi c hr e pl icate the a v ai l ab le evid ence . I ￿ nd, consi st e n t wi th
Ravn (19 93), th at onl y if the v ari abi li t y of governmen t exp e ndit u re di stur banc es w e re 100 ti mes
l arger than the one esti mated from th e dat a, wou ld the mo del b ea b l et o re pl icate the quan titat i ve
feat u res o fi n te rna ti ona l consump ti on corr e lations. T o pu t the resul t in a no ther wa y , to matc h
actual consumpti on c orrel at i ons and the rel at i ve ranki ng of i n te rn ati on al consumption and output
correlations wi th a mo del where b ot h governmen t and techn olo g y sho c ks ar e presen t, we ne ed a
v ari ab il ity of governmen t sp e ndi ng around 6% of i ts mean share, a v alue wh ic h i s not observ ed i n
anyi nd ust ri ali zed country . Not e aga i n that the resul ts are broa d ly ro b ust to c ou n try siz e an d to
the magnitud e of th e adjustmen t cost paramet er an d are in dep ende n t of the d etr e ndi ng metho d
empl o yed to i ndu ce stat i onar i t y in t he data .
Fi nall y , i t i s in terestin g to ask whether the assumption that he t er ogene it y e n ters the mo del
onl y th rough d i￿erenc es in countr y si ze has an y i mpl ic ati on sf o r the qu al i tativ e features of the
resul ts and fo r the magni tu de of cross co un try consu mpt i on correl ati on s. The ad ditiona l source of
heterogeneit y I consider i s l imited to the para me t ers o ft he ex o genous fo rce s. C ano v a and Marri nan
(1 996) sho ws tha tf o ra m o r e compl i cat ed mo de l, existing he t erogenei t y i n t he de ep par ameters i s
very mo dest and that result s are una￿ ec t ed b yc hang es of the p a rameters i n the ra ng eo f t h e
estimates obtain ed fo r the US, Canada and Europ e. Thi s suggests that the app ro ximat io n t ha t
countries ma yd i ￿ er primaril y b ecause of thei r si ze a nd e x o gen o u s disturba nces, i nstead of the ir
allo cativ e and pro ductiv e para meters, is somewhat justi￿ed.
All o wi ng fo r asymm et ri es in the sto c hastic p r o c esses g overning the exogenous sho c ks do e s n o t6 CONCL USIO NS 19
hel p muc hi nb r i nging si m ul ated cross co u n try consumpti on correl at i ons mo re in li n e wi th act ua l
correlations regar d less of the si ze of the countrie s, the v al ue of the adjus tmen t co st para meter a nd
the d etr e ndi ng metho d. I na l lc a s es consi dered, the quali ta ti v e feat u re s o f th e resul ts rema in even
though the in te rn ati on al c on sumption corr e lations ge nerat ed b y am o del wi th asymmetr ic drivi ng
for ce s are sl i gh tl y small er than in the baseli ne case. Not e how ever that di ￿ erence s rel ati v e to the
b enc hmark case presen ted i n tabl e4 ar e si g ni ￿ cant only when ￿ approac hes 1. Note also th at this
g
o ccu rs despi te the fact th at the asymmetries in tro duce d ar e relativ el y sma ll .
I h a ve al so conduc ted sev eral other ad diti ona ls e nsitivit y exp erime n ts, v ar yi ng the taxes rates
fro m 0.3 to 0.5 an d to 0 .0, c hangin g the st e ad y st ate share of governmen t cons ump ti on in output
fro m 0. 2t o 0.4 and 0.0, v aryi ng the v al ue of ￿ up to 0.75 and decreasi ng the st eady sta te rea l rate
of in terest to 4% p er year. None of these c hanges pro d uced app re ciabl ec hanges in the d istribu ti on
of i n ternati o nal pri v ate consu mp ti on and out p ut correlations from the b en c hma rk case s rep orted
i n ta b le 4.
6 Concl usio ns
Thi s pap e r an al yzed whether the i n tro du cti on of governme n t exp en di tu re sh o c ks i n a standard
one go od in ternat i onal real busi ness cycl e mo del can accoun t for the patter n of in ternational pri -
v ate consumpti on a nd output cor rel at i ons w e ob serv e i n the real w orld . The r esult s sho wt ha t
when governmen t exp e ndi tu re sho c ks ar e th eo n l y so u rce of busi ness cyc le ￿uctuations and gov-
ernmen t exp en di ture en ters the uti li t y functi on of agen ts and is hi gh ly sub stitutabl e wi th pri v ate
consumpti on, the mo del has so me p ot en ti al i n expl ain ing, b ot hq u al it ativ ely and quan titat i vely , the
observ ed corr e lations. Ho w ever, when b ot hg o v ern m en t exp end iture and tec hnolo gy dist ur ba nc e s
are p r es e n t,t he m o d el can not repro du ce the i n ternat i onal correlations w e se e i n the dat a, regard-
l ess o fh o w su bstituta b le are go vernmen t and pri v ate consumption i n the uti li t yo f a gents, unless
the v ari a bil it yo fg o vernmen t exp en dit ur es h o c ks i so f a n order of magni t ud e larger than what w e
see i n t he dat a.
Ih a vea l so tried to i den tify t he parameters whi c h app ear to b e more i mp ortan ti n b r i n g in g
si m ulat ed c o rrel at i ons more in l ine wi th actual ones. T he s e a re the par amet er regul at in g t he s ub -6 CONCL USIO NS 20
stitutabil i t y be t w ee np ri v ate and pu bli c consumption ￿ , the v ariabi li t y of governmen t consu m pt io n
g
exp endi ture, the e lastici t yo f th e i n vest ment c api t a l rati ot oc ha nges in T obi n’s Q and the p aram-
eters regul ati ng the b iv ari at es t oc hastic pro cess of the t ec h nology di stu rbances across countries.
In creasing the ￿rst three parameters from thei rb en c hma rk cal ibrated v al ues l ead s to a l o cat io n
shi ft i n th e si mulated di st ri buti on of in ternational consu mp ti on a nd ou tpu t correlations, whil e i n-
creasin g the asymmetr i es l eads tob oth a lo cation and a di sp ersi on shi ft. Bec au se so me of th ese
param e ters are v e ry i mpreci sel y e st i mat ed or no measuremen t e xists, the re su lts sugg e st the ne ed
of conduc ti ng empi ric al work ai med at get ti ng a ￿rmer gr asp of thei r mag ni tu de.
Because th e scop e of the pap er was to examin e the e￿e ct of governmen t consu mp ti on d istur-
bance s on in te rn ati on al p ri v ate c on sumption c orrel at i ons, I di d not rep or t the impl i cati on s of the
mo del fo r other imp ortan t b usin ess cycl e re gu lariti es (for th is exe rc ise, see i n part, Baxter an d
Cruci ni (199 3) and (19 95) ). Nor di d I add ress an y of the other de￿ cie nci es, s uc ha s the pri ce p uzzl e
(a s descri b ed , e.g. in Bac ku s, K ydland and K eho e (1995 )), whi c h are kn o wn to exist i n i n te rn ati on al
mo del s of th e bu sine ss cycl e
Because th ese e xercise s are i mp ort ant and may provi de a mor e comprehe nsiv e und ers tandi ng
of th e prop e rti es of th e data , they are rel egat ed to fu tu re re sear c h .APPENDIX 21
Da ta App endix
The da ta u sed in the study is all tak en fr om Data stream. Co n sumption measure s aggr eg ate
pri v ate real consumption exp e ndi tur eo n nond ura b les, durables and se rvi ces. I t is transfor med i n to
a p er-c a pi t a series b yd ivi di ng the origi nal seri es b y p opu lation. Because dat a on po p ulation is
annual , quar terl y d ata are obtaine d b y takin g the pred icted v alue so f an AR( 3) regr e ssion ￿tted
to a dumm y quarterly series, con st ruc t ed assigni ng the an n ual v alu e to each of the four quart e rs.
Governmen t data measures cu rre n t gov e rn ment exp endi ture, exce pt in the ca se of Austra l i a where
gro ss governme n t ￿ xed i n vest ment i s also in c l ude d. All data is i n real term s . The base year ,
how ever, d i￿ers acro ss countri es. F or Au strali a, Italy , J apan, UK, and W e s t German y the base i s
19 85, for F rance and S witzerl an d th e base is 19 80, for Canada th e base is 19 86 and fo r the US the
base is 19 87. All v ari able s are me asu re d i n annual ra tes.
Th es ampl e co vers th e p eri o d 1960 ,1-19 91,4 for Austra l i a, Ca na da , Uni te d K in gd om, USA an d
Germa n y; the p erio d 1965,1-19 91, 4 for J ap an ; the p eri o d 1967, 1-199 1,4 for S witzerl an d; a n d the
p erio d 1970 ,1-19 91, 4 for F ra n ce and Ita l y .REFERENCES 22
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T abl e 1: Es timate d Consump tion Corre la tions
AUS CAN FRA IT A JAP S WI UK US W G MI N MED IAN MAX
Linear ly Detr ended da ta
AUS 0 .7 67 0.38 7 0.246 0.809 0.154 -0.514 0 .7 26 0.78 3 -0.514 0.39 3 0.826
(0 .0 27) (0.04 2) (0.047 ) (0.014) (0.063) (0. 04 1 ) (0 .0 38) (0.22 3)
CAN 0.63 8 0.393 0.629 0.560 -0.226 0 .6 24 0.80 9
(0.04 4) (0.047 ) (0.035) (0.056) (0. 07 1 ) (0 .0 32) (0.02 0)
FR A 0.671 0.409 0.472 -0.184 0. 29 2 0.58 6
(0.042 ) (0.054) (0.061) (0. 0 61) (0 .0 55) (0.05 7)
IT A 0.194 0.449 -0.112 -0.103 0.27 4
(0.023) (0.050) (0. 0 41) (0. 05 7 ) (0.04 1)
JAP 0.367 -0.225 0 .4 43 0.82 6
(0.066) (0. 0 31) (0 .0 36) (0.01 5)
S WI 0.2 32 0 .4 26 0.38 3
(0. 0 64) (0 .0 52) (0.05 3)
UK -0.113 -0.331
(0 .0 59) (0.04 4)
US 0.55 1
(0.03 5)
HP Fi ltere d data
AUS 0 .2 17 0.23 7 0.250 0.232 0.024 0.1 15 0 .0 47 -0.194 -0.194 0.28 7 0.607
(0 .0 65) (0.08 3) (0.087 ) (0.072) (0.083) (0. 0 61) (0. 06 7 ) (0.06 8)
CAN 0.40 1 0.244 0.039 0.455 0.3 92 0 .6 07 0.06 0
(0.06 9) (0.051 ) (0.058) (0.059) (0. 0 49) (0 .0 41) (0.07 1)
FR A 0.172 0.428 0.439 0.5 08 0 .5 80 0.25 8
(0.075 ) (0.061) (0.091) (0. 0 54) (0 .0 90) (0.09 7)
IT A 0.317 0.468 0.3 95 0 .0 60 0.20 5
(0.068) (0.058) (0. 0 56) (0 .0 80) (0.09 6)
JAP 0.287 0.5 52 0 .4 08 0.22 9
(0.080) (0. 0 65) (0 .0 65) (0.08 0)
S WI 0.4 29 0 .45 1 0.51 1
(0. 0 53) (0 .0 59) (0.06 1)
UK 0 .3 66 0.12 5
(0. 05 8 ) (0.08 0)
US 0.34 0
(0.07 4)
FOD Fi lte red da ta
AUS 0. 41 9 0.40 3 0.070 0.251 0.269 0.0 46 0 .3 13 0.07 0 -0.038 0.15 4 0.531
(0. 0 68) (0.06 8) (0.097 ) (0.073) (0.093) (0. 0 78) (0 .0 66) (0.06 6)
CAN 0.29 7 0.133 0.071 0.344 0.0 89 0. 53 1 0.13 3
(0.06 8) (0.112 ) (0.068) (0.103) (0. 08 0 ) (0. 05 9 ) (0.06 6)
FR A 0.065 0.299 0.355 0.16 9 0. 16 2 0.30 5
(0.071 ) (0.068) (0.073) (0. 09 2 ) (0. 0 57) (0.06 4)
IT A 0.090 0.355 0.0 94 -0.038 0.04 8
(0.094) (0.118) (0. 07 8 ) (0. 10 1 ) (0.09 8)
JAP 0.035 0.07 7 0. 26 7 0.09 1
(0.068) (0. 04 8 ) (0. 04 6 ) (0.05 3)
SW I 0.15 4 0. 17 2 0.12 2
(0. 06 1 ) (0. 08 4 ) (0.05 3)
UK 0. 18 9 0.14 9
(0. 05 7 ) (0.06 8)
US 0.23 3
(0.07 7)
Not e s: S tand ard errors are i n pa ren thesis.T ABL ES 25
T a ble 2: Es ti ma ted Output Co rrelation s
AUS CAN FRA IT A JAP S WI UK US W G MI N MED IAN MAX
Linear ly Detr ended da ta
AUS 0 .8 40 0.28 8 0.150 0.752 0.298 0.4 52 0 .8 17 0.62 8 -0.094 0.36 1 0.840
(0 .0 22) (0.05 7) (0.046 ) (0.023) (0.085) (0. 05 0 ) (0 .0 32) (0.03 4)
CAN 0.44 9 0.373 0.429 -0.063 0.3 98 0 .7 43 0.66 7
(0.03 7) (0.031 ) (0.032) (0.073) (0. 06 1 ) (0 .0 33) (0.03 0)
FR A 0.794 0.295 -0.094 0.34 5 0. 36 1 0.61 1
(0.029 ) (0.058) (0.071) (0. 0 62) (0 .0 66) (0.06 3)
IT A 0.095 0.065 0.0 74 0 .2 14 0.42 9
(0.032) (0.055) (0. 0 74) (0. 06 6 ) (0.04 7)
JAP 0.253 0.1 45 0 .2 25 0.76 9
(0.077) (0. 0 36) (0 .0 48) (0.02 1)
S WI 0.5 67 0 .3 36 0.02 9
(0. 0 60) (0 .0 88) (0.09 6)
UK 0 .6 08 0.28 6
(0 .0 38) (0.05 9)
US 0.43 5
(0.03 8)
HP Fi ltere d data
AUS 0 .5 14 0.32 6 0.463 0.412 0.424 0.3 40 0 .3 89 0.34 6 0.1 65 0.41 2 0.789
(0 .0 61) (0.05 1) (0.051 ) (0.036) (0.058) (0. 0 50) (0. 06 2 ) (0.05 1)
CAN 0.44 4 0.354 0.165 0.425 0.4 60 0 .7 44 0.32 2
(0.04 7) (0.048 ) (0.053) (0.040) (0. 0 45) (0 .0 27) (0.06 2)
FR A 0.588 0.511 0.536 0.6 55 0 .5 96 0.48 8
(0.065 ) (0.061) (0.066) (0. 0 51) (0 .0 74) (0.08 0)
IT A 0.324 0.789 0.3 08 0 .3 34 0.49 6
(0.086) (0.045) (0. 0 75) (0 .0 58) (0.05 1)
JAP 0.377 0.3 10 0 .3 30 0.64 5
(0.061) (0. 0 81) (0 .0 85) (0.04 2)
S WI 0.2 09 0 .39 5 0.40 7
(0. 0 71) (0 .0 53) (0.05 3)
UK 0 .5 95 0.36 6
(0. 04 9 ) (0.06 0)
US 0.41 9
(0.07 8)
FOD Fi lte red da ta
AUS 0. 33 8 0.14 9 0.198 0.231 0.176 0.1 74 0 .2 82 -0.014 -0.053 0.20 6 0.566
(0. 0 67) (0.08 3) (0.090 ) (0.054) (0.077) (0. 0 69) (0 .0 75) (0.08 3)
CAN 0.26 4 0.090 0.238 0.135 0.1 45 0. 56 6 0.15 8
(0.07 7) (0.082 ) (0.067) (0.073) (0. 08 2 ) (0. 05 3 ) (0.06 3)
FR A 0.554 0.247 0.300 0.23 1 0. 39 3 0.38 7
(0.059 ) (0.104) (0.078) (0. 07 0 ) (0. 0 80) (0.06 0)
IT A 0.114 0.490 0.0 61 0. 20 6 0.29 5
(0.056) (0.070) (0. 06 5 ) (0. 06 1 ) (0.06 2)
JAP -0.053 0.24 7 0. 25 1 0.15 0
(0.091) (0. 05 8 ) (0. 07 1 ) (0.06 5)
SW I 0.06 3 0. 34 2 0.14 5
(0. 06 1 ) (0. 08 3 ) (0.06 9)
UK 0. 18 2 0.27 5
(0. 08 0 ) (0.08 2)
US 0.14 4
(0.06 6)
Not e s: S tand ard errors are i n pa ren thesis.T ABL ES 26
T a ble 3: Cal ib ra ted V a lues for th eP ar a me ters
B asi c Si mulation s
US-Cana da US -Europ e
La b our au gmen ti ng tech nol ogi cal progres s: ￿ 1.004 1.004
x
S teady sta te G/ Y sh are: s 0.2 0 0.20
g
T ax rate: ￿ 0.3 0 0.3 0
￿
S teady sta te h ours: N 0.2 0.2
S teady sta te i n teres t rate : R 0.065 0.065
La b or sha re in p ro du ction : 1 ￿ ￿ 0.58 0.6 0
El astici ty of I/ K to T obi n’s Q: ￿ -0 .07 5 -0. 07 5
S S T o bin’s Q: S ST 1.0 1.0
D epreci ati on rate: ￿ 0.025 0.025
CRR A p arameter: ￿ 2.0 2.0
P o pul ati on sh are: ￿ 0.9 0.5






US Canad a US Europ e
T ec h nol ogy s ho c ks
￿ 0.866 0.02 0.904 0.0 52
0 .04 0.929 0.149 0.9 08
￿ 0.0 0061 0.0002 3 0.0008 2 0 .00 018
0.0 0023 0.0007 1 0.0001 8 0 .00 063
Go v ern ment sho c ks
￿ 0 .95 0 .0 0.95 0.0
0.0 0.95 0 .0 0.90
￿ 0.0 0016 0 .0 0.0001 6 0.0
0.0 0.0001 6 0 .0 0 .00 010
Sy mmetric tec h nol ogy sh o c ks
￿ 0.898 0.043 0.906 0.0 88
0.043 0.898 0.088 0.9 06
￿ 0.00 0 6 4 0.0001 6 0.0007 2 0. 00 018
0.00 0 1 6 0.0006 4 0.0001 8 0. 00 072T ABL ES 27
T abl e 4: B asi cS i mula tio ns
￿ = 0: 90 ￿ = 0:5 0
L T HP F OD L T HP F OD
T ec hn ology [0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0. 9 9, 0 .99 ] [0.99, 0.99 ] [0 .9 9, 0.99]
S ho c k s 0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0 .00
[-0. 1 7, 0.45 ] [-0. 0 9, 0.99 ] [0.28, 0.55] [-0.46, 0.25] [- 0. 13 , 0.24] [0. 3 1, 0.56]
0.99 0.94 1.00 1. 00 1.00 0 .95
Gov ernment ￿ = 0: 0 [0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [-0. 5 9, 0 .56 ] [0. 99 , 0 .99 ] [0.9 9, 0.99] [-0.53, 0.4 8]
g
Sh o c k s 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0 .00
[0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0. 99 , 0 .99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0 .9 9, 0.9 9]
0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0 .00
￿ = 0: 2 [0.88, 0.97] [0.99, 0.99] [-0. 5 3, 0 .51 ] [0. 7 7, 0 .95 ] [0.98, 0.99] [-0 .67, 0.4 2]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0 .00
[0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0. 9 8, 0 .99 ] [0.98, 0.99] [0 .9 7, 0.9 9]
0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0 .00
￿ = 0: 5 [0.19, 0.81] [0.93, 0.96] [-0. 6 4, 0 .47 ] [0. 0 1, 0 .72 ] [0.87, 0.93] [-0 .71, 0.4 4]
g
0.46 0.00 0.00 0 .6 9 0.00 0 .00
[0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0. 9 5, 0 .98 ] [0.95, 0.97] [0 .9 3, 0.9 7]
0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0 .00
￿ = 0: 8 [-0. 2 2, 0.55 ] [0.52, 0.70] [-0. 59 , 0. 49 ] [-0.28, 0.60] [0.44, 0.65] [ -0.57, 0.5 9]
g
0.97 0.98 0.08 0 .9 2 0.26 0 .01
[0.46, 0.84] [0.73, 0.87] [0.91, 0.95] [-0.15, 0.52] [0.61, 0.80] [0 .6 6, 0. 79]
0.66 0.06 0.02 0 .8 6 0.01 0. 00
￿ = 1: 0 [-0. 5 7, 0.54 ] [-0. 0 7, 0.18 ] [-0. 6 7, 0. 62 ] [-0.51, 0.60] [- 0 .5 1, 0.23 ] [-0.63, 0.6 4]
g
0.98 1.00 1.00 0 .9 7 1.00 1 .00
[-0.57, -0.11] [-0. 4 2, 0.11 ] [-0.54, -.32] [-0. 8 4, -0.30] [0.38, 0.59] [- 0 .5 4, -0.18]
1.00 1.00 1.00 1 .0 0 1.00 1 .00
Gov ernment an d ￿ = 0: 0 [0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.36, 0.82] [0. 9 8, 0 .99 ] [0 .99, 0.99] [0 .6 9, 0.92]
g
T ec hn olo gy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0 .00
Sh o c k s [-0. 2 1, 0.46 ] [0.00, 0.36] [0.34, 0.60] [-0.44, 0.37] [- 0 .2 0, 0.26] [0 .5 0, 0.59]
1.00 1.00 0.87 0 .9 7 1.00 1. 00
￿ =0 : 2 [0.98, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.37, 0.86] [0. 9 8, 0 .99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0 .6 2, 0.91]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0 .00
[-0. 1 6, 0.46 ] [-0. 17 , 0.26 ] [0.20, 0.49] [-0. 7 6, -0.22] [- 0 .4 3, 0.00] [0 .0 2, 0.33]
0.94 1.00 0.01 1 .0 0 1.00 0 .50
￿ = 0: 5 [0.97, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.49, 0.87] [0. 9 7, 0 .99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0 .6 5, 0.93]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0 .00
[-0. 39 , 0.48 ] [-0. 3 2, 0.13 ] [0.01, 0.25] [-0.67, 0.30] [-0.50, -0. 0 6] [-0. 02, 0. 28 ]
1.00 1.00 1.00 0 .9 7 1.00 0 .54
￿ =0 : 8 [0.94, 0.98] [0.99, 0.99] [0.43, 0.86] [0. 97 , 0. 99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0. 8 0, 0.95]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0. 00
[-0. 3 9, 0.44 ] [-0. 4 0, 0.06 ] [-0. 26 , 0. 00 ] [-0.57, 0.39] [-0.36, -0. 03 ] [ 0.02, 0. 30 ]
1.00 1.00 1.00 0. 9 8 1.00 0. 40
￿ =1 : 0 [0.93, 0.98] [0.98, 0.99] [0.44, 0.89] [0. 96 , 0. 99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0. 6 9, 0.94]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0. 00
[-0. 3 2, 0.56 ] [-0. 4 3, 0.03 ] [-0.39, -0.15] [-0.71, 0.23] [-0.64, -0. 37 ] [- 0. 4 4, -0.10]
1.00 1.00 1.00 1. 00 1.00 1. 00
Not e s: The ￿rs t (third) ro wo f e a c hs i m ulati on rep orts the 90% rang e o f the sim ulated cross country c onsumption
(ou t p ut) distri buti on, the se cond (fou rth) the probabil it y th at the mo del gen erates the v alue w eo b s e r v ei n
the actu al d ata.T ABL ES 28
T a bl e 5.1: Sensit ivit y An alys i s
￿ = 0: 90 ￿ = 0 :50
L T HP F OD L T HP F OD
￿ = ￿ 0: 01
T ec hn olo gy [0.91, 0.97] [0. 9 8, 0.99 ] [0.94, 0.97] [0 .94 , 0.98] [0.99, 0. 99 ] [0.96 , 0.98]
S ho c k s 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0.29, -0.45] [-0. 7 3, -0.45] [-0.28, -0. 0 2] [-0.85, 0.4 9] [-0.77, -0 .54 ] [-0.23, 0 .10 ]
1.00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Gov ernment an d ￿ = 0: 0 [0.99, 0.99] [0. 99 , 0.99 ] [- 0 .53 , 0.54] [0 .99 , 0.99] [ 0.99, 0.9 9] [-0.55, 0 .54 ]
g
S ho c k s 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.99, 0.99] [0. 99 , 0.99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0 .99 , 0.99] [0.99, 0.9 9] [0.99 , 0.9 9]
0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 2 [0.87, 0.97] [0. 9 4, 0.99 ] [- 0 .64 , 0.49] [0. 78 , 0.96] [0.98, 0.9 9] [-0 .68, 0 .56 ]
g
0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.99, 0.99] [0. 9 9, 0.99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0 .98 , 0.99] [0.98, 0.9 9] [0.97 , 0.9 8]
0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 5 [0.12, 0.77] [0. 9 1, 0.95 ] [- 0. 67 , 0.48] [0 .07 , 0.78] [0.86, 0.9 3] [-0 .66, 0 .55 ]
g
0.61 0 .00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00
[0.97, 0.99] [0. 9 9, 0.99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0 .90 , 0.97] [0.94, 0.9 6] [0.93 , 0.96]
0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 8 [-0. 2 8, 0.56 ] [0. 5 4, 0.68 ] [- 0 .61 , 0.55] [-0.20, 0. 53 ] [0.43, 0.6 6] [ -0.58, 0 .47 ]
g
0.92 0 .90 0.05 0.94 0.31 0.23
[0.80, 0.92] [0. 9 5, 0.97 ] [0.97, 0.98] [ 0.39, 0.8 1] [0.82, 0.8 8] [0.71 , 0.8 4]
0.06 0 .02 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01
￿ = 1: 0 [-0. 5 8, 0.60 ] [-0.09, 0.26] [- 0 .64 , 0.66] [-0.49, 0.5 5] [-0.08 , 0.22 ] [-0.65, 0 .62 ]
g
0.96 1 .00 1.00 0.94 0.85 0.96
[-0.96, -0.60] [-0. 7 4, -0.38] [-0. 7 6, -.58] [- 0 .96 , -0.80] [0.07, 0. 3 5] [- 0.63 , -0.40]
1.00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Gov ernment an d ￿ = 0: 0 [0.90, 0.97] [0. 9 8, 0.99 ] [0.33, 0.81] [0 .94 , 0.98] [0 .99, 0.9 9] [0.63 , 0.91]
g
T ec hn olo gy 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S ho c k s [-0.80, -0.33] [-0. 66 , -0.31] [0.23, 0.07] [- 0 .85 , -0.42] [-0.79, -0 .52 ] [-0.22, 0 .11 ]
1.00 1 .00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.97
￿ = 0: 2 [0.90, 0.97] [0. 9 8, 0.99 ] [0.38, 0.88] [0 .92 , 0.98] [0.98, 0. 99 ] [0.5 1 , 0.88]
g
0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0. 8 5, 0.26 ] [-0. 7 5, -0.46] [-0.35, -0. 0 6] [- 0 .53 , -0.88] [-0.89, -0 .73 ] [-0.58 , -0.31]
1.00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
￿ = 0: 5 [0.85, 0.97] [0. 9 8, 0.99 ] [0.37, 0.85] [0 .93 , 0.98] [0.99, 0.9 9] [0.6 2 , 0.91]
g
0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0.85, -0.32] [-0. 8 0, -0.50] [-0.55, -0. 28 ] [- 0. 80 , -0.27] [-0.86, - 0. 67 ] [-0.50 , -0.24]
1.00 1. 00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00
￿ =0 : 8 [0.84, 0.96] [0. 9 8, 0.98 ] [0.39, 0.85] [0. 93 , 0.98] [0.99, 0. 9 9] [0.71 , 0.92]
g
0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0. 8 2, 0.25 ] [-0.85,-0.59] [- 0. 66 , -0.29] [-0.83,-0.2 5] [-0.87, - 0. 72 ] [-0.65,-0 . 32 ]
1.00 1. 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
￿ =1 : 0 [0.84, 0.96] [0. 9 7, 0.98 ] [0.40, 0.88] [0. 90 , 0.98] [0.98, 0. 99 ] [0.69 , 0.93]
g
0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0.85, -0.25] [-0. 8 6, -0.60] [-0.73, -0. 57 ] [- 0. 89 , -0.20] [-0.92, - 0. 80 ] [-0.76 , -0.57]
1.00 1. 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Not e s: The ￿rs t (third) ro wo f e a c hs i m ulati on rep orts the 90% rang e o f the sim ulated cross country c onsumption
(ou t p ut) distri buti on, the se cond (fou rth) the probabil it y th at the mo del gen erates the v alue w eo b s e r v ei n
the actu al d ata.T ABL ES 29
T a ble 5.2: Sen s itivi t y An alys i s
￿ = 0: 90 ￿ = 0 :50
L T HP F OD L T HP F OD
￿ = 10
T ec hn olo gy [0.97, 0.99] [0.98, 0.99] [0.98, 0.9 9] [0.99, 0.9 9] [0.99 , 0.99 ] [0.99 , 0.99]
S ho c k s 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[ 0.3 0, 0.70 ] [ 0.5 2, 0.77 ] [ 0.77, 0.87] [0 . 7 7 , 0.89] [ 0.81, 0 .90 ] [ 0.91, 0 .95 ]
0.98 0.89 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Gov ernment ￿ = 0: 0 [0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [-0.58, 0.49] [0.99, 0.9 9] [0.9 9 , 0.99] [-0.64, 0 .51 ]
g
S ho c k s 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0. 9 9] [0.99, 0.9 9] [0.99 , 0.99] [0.99 , 0.9 9]
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 2 [0.89, 0.98] [0.94, 0.99] [-0.61, 0.53] [0.81, 0.97 ] [0.98 ,0 . 9 9 ] [-0 .68, 0 .48 ]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.99, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.98, 0.9 9] [0.98, 0.99 ] [0.98 , 0.99] [0.93 , 0.9 8]
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 5 [0.35, 0.88] [0.94, 0.97] [-0.61, 0.62] [0.33, 0. 83 ] [0.91 , 0.95] [-0 .60, 0 .45 ]
g
0.25 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00
[0.63, 0.93] [0.91, 0.95] [0.93, 0.9 6] [0.21, 0.8 5] [0.83 , 0.91] [0.87 , 0.93]
0.14 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 8 [0.12, 0.75] [0.82, 0.93] [-0.59, 0.54] [0.03, 0.6 4] [0.78 , 0.86] [-0 .57, 0. 52 ]
g
0.84 0.87 0.11 0.86 0.35 0.02
[0.40, 0.82] [0.57, 0.72] [0.71, 0.8 5] [0.10, 0. 8 2] [0.68 , 0.83] [0.60 , 0.7 6]
0.64 0.10 0.03 0.79 0.03 0.02
￿ = 1: 0 [-0. 0 8, 0.73 ] [ 0.7 4, 0.85 ] [-0.55, 0.70] [-0.05, 0.71] [ 0.63, 0 .78 ] [ -0.56, 0 .73 ]
g
0.77 0.15 0.00 0.78 0.01 0.00
[-0. 6 8, 0.34 ] [-0. 3 2, 0.15 ] [-0.55, 0.70] [-0.05, 0.71] [0.63 , 0.78] [-0.5 6, 0 .73 ]
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.96
Gov ernment an d ￿ = 0: 0 [0.92, 0.98] [0.89, 0.93] [0.72, 0.9 3] [0.99, 0.9 9] [0.99 , 0.99] [0.90 , 0.97]
g
T ec hn olo gy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S ho c k s [0.28, 0.83] [0 . 15 , 0.60 ] [0.16, 0.4 6] [0.77, 0.8 9] [ 0.81, 0 .90 ] [ 0. 90, 0. 95 ]
0.79 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 2 [0.97, 0.99] [0.99, 0.90] [0.84, 0.9 6] [0.97, 0.9 9] [0.98 ,0 . 9 9 ] [0.7 9 , 0.95]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.25, 0.69] [0.37, 0.68] [0.66, 0.8 2] [0.08, 0.5 9] [0.13 , 0.49] [0.43 , 0.6 9]
1.00 0.90 0.00 0.72 0.78 0.00
￿ = 0: 5 [0.97, 0.99] [0.99, 0.99] [0.90, 0.9 7] [0.90, 0.9 9] [0.99 , 0.99] [0.9 6 , 0.99]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0.02, -0.39] [0.80, 0.35] [0.32, 0. 57 ] [0.14, 0. 55 ] [0.39 ,0 . 6 7 ] [0.67 , 0.88]
0.96 1.00 0.00 0.68 0.09 0.00
￿ =0 : 8 [0.92, 0.98] [0.99, 0.99] [0.92, 0. 97 ] [0.93, 0. 98 ] [0.99 , 0.99] [0.96 , 0.99]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0. 3 8, 0.01 ] [ 0.1 4, 0.34 ] [0.19, 0. 39 ] [-0.18, 0.15] [ 0.15, 0 . 27 ] [ 0.05, 0 . 31 ]
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
￿ =1 : 0 [0.88, 0.98] [0.99, 0.99] [0.95, 0. 98 ] [0.94, 0. 98 ] [0.99 , 0.99] [0.97 , 0.99]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0. 5 1, 0.44 ] [-0. 2 2, 0.23 ] [0.08, 0. 36 ] [-0.51, - 0. 57 ] [-0.57 , -0.12] [-0 .04, 0 . 29 ]
0.94 1.00 0.16 1.00 1.00 0.58
Not e s: The ￿rs t (third) ro wo f e a c hs i m ulati on rep orts the 90% rang e o f the sim ulated cross country c onsumption
(ou t p ut) distri buti on, the se cond (fou rth) the probabil it y th at the mo del gen erates the v alue w eo b s e r v ei n
the actu al d ata.T ABL ES 30
T a bl e 5.3: Sensit ivit y An alys i s
￿ = 0: 90 ￿ = 0 :50
L T HP F OD L T HP F OD
￿ = 0 :2
g
Gov ernment ￿ = 0: 0 [0.99, 0.99] [0. 9 9, 0.99 ] [- 0 .27 , 0.02] [0 .99 , 0.99] [0.9 9, 0.9 9] [-0.26, 0 .05 ]
g
S ho c k s 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.67, 0.81] [0. 8 1, 0.88 ] [0.58, 0.77] [0 .80 , 0.88] [0.86, 0. 9 1] [0.73 , 0.8 6]
0.30 0 .00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 2 [0.68, 0.80] [0. 65 , 0.81 ] [- 0 .22 , 0.03] [0 .75 , 0.87] [0.76, 0.8 7] [-0 .25, 0 .03 ]
g
0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.53, 0.72] [0. 7 7, 0.85 ] [0.44, 0.66] [0 .69 , 0.81] [0.81, 0.8 8] [0.59 , 0.78]
0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 5 [0.22, 0.49] [0. 2 0, 0.48 ] [- 0 .21 , 0.10] [0 .27 , 0.52] [0.23, 0.5 1] [-0 .19, 0 .10 ]
g
1.00 0 .92 0.95 0.99 0.00 0.03
[0.07, 0.39] [0. 6 6, 0.77 ] [- 0 .03 , 0.29] [0 .35 , 0.58] [0.70, 0.8 1] [0.23 , 0. 91]
1.00 0 .75 1.00 0.29 0.00 0.00
￿ =0 : 8 [ 0.0 2, 0.36 ] [0. 0 8, 0.30 ] [- 0 .19 , 0.09] [0 .08 , 0.41] [0.17, 0.4 2] [-0 .17, 0 .15 ]
g
1.00 0 .99 0.68 1.00 0.58 0.61
[-0. 1 7, 0.25 ] [0. 37 , 0.56 ] [- 0 .24 , 0.05] [-0.08, 0.3 7] [0.58, 0.7 8] [-0.31 ,0 .09 ]
0.90 0 .66 0.39 0.97 0.00 0.00
￿ = 1: 0 [-0. 1 0, 0.21 ] [ -0 .12 , 0.23] [- 0 .15 , 0.21] [-0.09, 0.2 0] [ -0.14, 0 .21 ] [-0.13, 0 .18 ]
g
1.00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.90
[-0.48, -0.24] [-0. 4 8, -0.03] [-0.47, -0. 1 8] [- 0 .46 , -0.18] [0.47, 0. 6 3] [-0.47 , -0.15]
1.00 1 .00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Gov ernment an d ￿ = 0: 0 [0.97, 0.99] [0. 9 9, 0.99 ] [0.94, 0.97] [0 .98 , 0.99] [0 .99, 0.9 9] [0.94 , 0.97]
g
T ec hn olo gy 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S ho c k s [-0.72, -0.06] [-0.20, 0.20] [0.28, 0.32] [-0.10, 0.6 6] [-0.15 , 0.2 5] [ 0.22, 0 .46 ]
1.00 1 .00 0.98 0.67 0.99 0.00
￿ = 0: 2 [0.98, 0.99] [0. 9 9, 0.99 ] [0.95, 0.97] [0. 98 , 0.99] [0.99, 0.9 9] [0.9 7 , 0.98]
g
0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0. 68 , -0.16 ] [-0.32, 0.05] [0.12, 0.40] [-0.14, 0.7 4] [-0.25, -0 .17 ] [ 0. 06, 0 .41 ]
1.00 1 .00 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.17
￿ = 0: 5 [0.97, 0.99] [0. 9 9, 0.99 ] [0.96, 0.98] [0 .98 , 0.99] [0.99, 0.9 9] [0.9 5 , 0.97]
g
0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0.79, -0.19] [-0.52 -0.06] [-0.12, -0. 2 0] [-0.29, 0.6 6] [-0.35 , 0.04] [- 0.08, 0 .17 ]
1.00 1 .00 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.91
￿ =0 : 8 [0.96, 0.99] [0. 9 9, 0.99 ] [0.96, 0.98] [0 .98 , 0.99] [0.99, 0.9 9] [0.9 6, 0.98]
g
0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0. 80 , -0.17 ] [-0.55,-0.14] [- 0 .34 , -0.22] [-0.31, 0. 65 ] [-0.47 , 0.01] [ -0.33, 0 . 08 ]
1.00 1. 00 1.00 0.68 1.00 0.94
￿ =1 : 0 [0.96, 0.99] [0. 9 9, 0.99 ] [0.97, 0.98] [0 .98 , 0.99] [0.98, 0. 99 ] [0.96 , 0.98]
g
0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[-0.82, -0.18] [-0. 6 1, -0.26] [-0.48, -0. 24 ] [-0.34, 0. 6 8] [-0.52, - 0. 02 ] [-0.51 , -0.24]
1.00 1. 00 1.00 0.71 1.00 1.00
Not e s: The ￿rs t (third) ro wo f e a c hs i m ulati on rep orts the 90% rang e o f the sim ulated cross country c onsumption
(ou t p ut) distri buti on, the se cond (fou rth) the probabil it y th at the mo del gen erates the v alue w eo b s e r v ei n
the actu al d ata.T ABL ES 31
T abl e 5.4 : Sensiti vit y Anal ys i s
￿ = 0: 90 ￿ = 0: 50
L T HP F OD L T HP F OD
v ar g =0 :0 064
t
Gov ernment an d ￿ = 0: 0 [0.99, 0. 99 ] [0.99, 0 .9 9] [-0. 4 5, 0 .51 ] [0. 9 9, 0 .99 ] [ 0.99, 0.99] [- 0. 5 3, 0.59]
g
T ec hn olo gy 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0.00
S ho c k s [0.52, 0 .8 3] [ 0.67, 0.84] [0.84, 0.92] [ 0.21, 0.72] [ 0. 48 , 0.74] [ 0. 7 6, 0.86]
0.5 8 0.32 0.00 0 .3 8 0.00 0.00
￿ = 0: 2 [0.91, 0 .9 8] [0.99, 0. 99 ] [-0. 5 1, 0 .52 ] [0. 9 2, 0 .98 ] [0.99, 0.99] [- 0 .51 , 0.47]
g
0.0 0 0.0 0 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0.00
[ 0.40, 0.79] [ 0.54, 0.77] [0 . 78 , 0 .88 ] [-0.06, 0.56] [ 0 .2 4, 0.61] [ 0 .6 6, 0. 80]
0.8 9 0.9 0 0.00 0 .75 0.29 0.00
￿ = 0: 5 [0.59, 0 .9 2] [0.95, 0 .9 7] [-0. 4 9, 0. 54 ] [0. 6 7, 0 .94 ] [0.96, 0.97] [- 0 .6 0, 0.60]
g
0.0 6 0.00 0.00 0 .0 1 0.00 0.00
[ 0.02, 0.66] [ 0.18, 0.53] [ 0.5 4, 0 .73 ] [-0.32, 0.48] [- 0 .0 2, 0.37] [ 0 .4 0, 0.63]
0.9 9 1.0 0 0.12 0 .9 3 0.96 0.00
￿ = 0: 8 [0.32, 0 .8 0] [0.80, 0 .8 9] [-0. 4 9, 0 .55 ] [0. 3 4, 0 .87 ] [0.88, 0.93] [- 0. 5 5, 0.61]
g
0.4 5 0.2 1 0.00 0 .2 8 0.00 0.00
[-0.34, 0.46] [-0.27, 0.14] [ 0.1 9, 0 .47 ] [-0.49, 0.35] [- 0 .3 3, 0.18] [ 0. 15 , 0.45]
1.0 0 1.0 0 0.25 0 .9 8 1.00 0.59
￿ = 1: 0 [0.02, 0. 7 8] [0.70, 0 .8 3] [-0. 5 0, 0 .60 ] [0. 1 2, 0. 81 ] [0.80, 0.90] [- 0 .5 0, 0.64]
g
0.7 8 0.4 8 0.00 0 .3 7 0.00 0.00
[-0.43, 0.44] [-0.45, -0.00 ] [-0.43, -0.18] [-0.65, 0.29] [-0.57, -0. 14 ] [ -0 .2 8, 0.03]
1.0 0 1.0 0 1.00 1 .0 0 1.00 0.98
Asymme tri c Exo genou s F orces
T ec hn olo gy [0.96, 0 .9 8] [0.99, 0 .9 9] [0.98, 0.99] [0. 9 6, 0. 98 ] [0.99, 0.99 ] [0.99, 0.99]
S ho c k s 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00
[-0.13, 0.35] [-0.20, 0.27] [ 0.0 8, 0 .35 ] [-0.93, 0.47] [- 0 .2 5, 0.25] [ 0 .4 5, 0.67]
1.0 0 1.0 0 1.00 1 .0 0 1.00 0.37
Gov ernment an d ￿ = 0: 0 [0.97, 0 .9 8] [0.99, 0 .9 9] [-0. 2 8, 0 .65 ] [0. 9 6, 0 .98 ] [ 0.99, 0.99] [0.75, 0.95]
g
T ec hn olo gy 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00
S ho c k s [-0.15, 0.48] [ 0.08, 0.46] [0.41, 0.64] [-0. 9 1, -0.36] [- 0 .2 0, 0.30 ] [ 0 .5 0, 0.69]
1.0 0 1.0 0 0.63 1 .0 0 1.00 0.33
￿ = 0: 2 [0.95, 0 .98 ] [0.99, 0 .9 9] [-0. 2 9, 0 .64 ] [0. 9 6, 0 .98 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0. 75, 0.94]
g
0.00 0.0 0 0.00 0 .0 0 0.00 0.00
[-0.16, 0.38] [-0.15, 0.33] [ 0.1 9, 0 .48 ] [-0. 93 , -0.55] [-0.34, -0. 1 4] [ 0 .3 5, 0.59]
1.0 0 1.00 1.00 1 .0 0 1.00 0.80
￿ =0 : 5 [0.85, 0 .9 7] [0.98, 0 .9 9] [-0. 2 6, 0 .69 ] [0. 9 5, 0 .99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0. 78, 0.95]
g
0.0 0 0.0 0 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00
[-0.18, 0.43] [-0.24, 0.25] [-0. 0 7, 0 .26 ] [-0. 9 4, -0.61] [-0.00, -0. 4 7] [ 0. 1 8, 0.45]
1.00 1.00 1.00 1. 00 1.00 1.00
￿ = 0: 8 [0.82, 0 . 96 ] [0.98, 0 . 98 ] [0.39, 0.84] [0. 93 , 0. 99 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0.7 5, 0.94]
g
0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00
[-0.84, 0.21] [-0.84,-0.54] [-0. 6 9,- 0. 17 ] [-0.88,-0.25] [-0.85, -0. 67 ] [- 0. 55 , -0.21]
1.00 1.00 1.00 1. 00 1.00 1.00
￿ =1 : 0 [0.60, 0 . 92 ] [0.94, 0 . 97 ] [-0. 16 , 0. 70 ] [0. 93 , 0. 98 ] [0.99, 0.99] [0. 78, 0.96]
g
0.05 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 0.00
[-0.20, 0.40] [-0.399 0.03] [-0.55, -0.31] [-0. 9 7, -0.75] [-0.72, -0. 43 ] [- 0. 2 5, 0.03]
1.00 1.00 1.00 1. 00 1.00 1.00
Not e s: The ￿rs t (third) ro wo f e a c hs i m ulati on rep orts the 90% rang e o f the sim ulated cross country c onsumption
(ou t p ut) distri buti on, the se cond (fou rth) the probabil it y th at the mo del gen erates the v alue w eo b s e r v ei n
the actu al d ata.